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I. INTRODUCTION
[1] Patents have traditionally been territorial creatures. The territorial
nature of U.S. patents is reflected by the main infringement statute, § 271
of Title 35. For example, § 271(a) says that “whoever without authority
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the
United States or imports into the United States any patented invention
during the term of the patent therefore, infringes the patent.”1
[2] By contrast, we now live in a highly competitive global economy
where territorial barriers are being strained and broken. Products are
exported from the United States to the far reaches of the world. For
example, software may be exported, or may be transmitted offshore
electronically, and then replicated for use abroad. Can § 271 reach those
activities?
[3] Conversely, increasing numbers of products are being imported into
the United States from many countries where enforcement of intellectual
*

Eric W. Guttag is a partner in the law firm of Jagtiani+Guttag. The author would also
like to gratefully acknowledge the efforts of Min H. Park, (J.D. 2006, George Mason
University School of Law), and Joshua A. Puvak (J.D. 2007, American University
Washington College of Law), in assisting in the preparation of this article.
1
35 U.S.C. § 271 (2003) (emphasis added).
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property rights such as patents may be more lax, or not available for
certain technologies such as computer software. For example, these
imported products may be in the form of data obtained by a process
covered by a U.S. patent, or may have been developed based on such data.
Can such importation be prevented by § 271?
[4] Enter the Internet and the World Wide Web. In cyberspace, territorial
barriers to the transfer of data, information and even software basically do
not exist. With the latest Internet communication protocols and
compression technologies (e.g., MP3), information, data and software
transfer can occur in an instant or two anywhere in the world and at any
time. These transfers often happen without any knowledge or warning
that they have occurred. How does a U.S. patent owner police cyberspace
for infringement? Consider the following scenarios:
Scenario 1: Patentee has a U.S. patent on a system and
process for providing electronic products (e.g., software)
from a server over the Internet. Offshore Seller has a web
site outside the United States that offers for sale software
that can be downloaded from Offshore Seller’s server to a
buyer’s computer, and with instructions that use the
patented system and process for downloading that software.
Using instructions on Offshore Seller’s web site, Onshore
Buyer downloads the software from Offshore Seller’s
server to Onshore Buyer’s computer located in the United
States.2

2

See NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd. (BlackBerry II), 418 F.3d 1282, 1291 (Fed.
Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1157 (2006) (finding that the BlackBerry system which
uses relay component located in Canada infringes system claims under § 271(a), but not
method claims under §§ 271(a), 271(f), or 271(g)); Budd Co. v. Complax Corp., 19
U.S.P.Q.2d 1318, 1319 (E.D.Mich. 1990) (holding that Canadian maker of parts by
patented process, that did not import parts into the United States, may be found liable
under § 271(g) if it induces another to import those parts). But see Bayer AG v. Housey
Pharms., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (ruling that “information” generated
according to patented process outside the United States but imported into the United
States, does not infringe under § 271(g)); Pfizer, Inc. v. Aceto Corp., 853 F.Supp. 104
(S.D.N.Y 1994) (finding no infringement under § 271(g) where foreign maker of flavor
enhancer, allegedly made by patented process, sold enhancer to another foreign
corporation that sold it to U.S. importer).

2
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Scenario 2: Patentee has a U.S. patent on video game
software that requires multiple computer files to be
executable. Service Provider puts some computer files on
server 1 and the remaining computer files on server 2 that
can be downloaded to a customer’s computer and combined
together to provide an executable copy of the patented
video game software. At least one of Service Provider’s
servers is located in the United States. Service Provider
offers instructions through its web site for downloading
computer files from servers 1 and 2 to the customer’s
computer and combining same to provide an executable
copy of the video game software. Using instructions on
Service Provider’s web site, Offshore Buyer downloads
computer files from servers 1 and 2 to Offshore Buyer’s
computer located outside the United States and then
combines them on that computer to provide an executable
copy of the patented video game software.3
Scenario 3A: Patentee has a U.S. patent on a process and
system for making designs. Offshore Seller has a web site
outside the United States that offers software for executing
the patented process and system that can be downloaded
from Offshore Seller’s server to buyer’s computer.
Onshore Buyer downloads computer software from
Offshore Seller’s server to Onshore Buyer’s computer
located in the United States.4
3

See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007), reversing AT&T Corp. v.
Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that copies of operating
system software replicated abroad do not infringe under § 271(f)); Eolas Techs., Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 998 (2005)
(finding that software code on golden master disks is “component” within meaning of §
271(f)(1)). See also 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2) (“Whoever without authority supplies or
causes to supply in or from the United States any component of a patented invention that
is made or especially adapted for use [therein] . . . .”).
4
See BlackBerry II, 418 F.3d at 1291 (holding that BlackBerry system that uses relay
component located in Canada infringes system claims under § 271(a), but not method
claims under §§ 271(a), 271(f), or 271(g)). Cf. Decca, Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d
1070, 1075 (Fed. Cl. 1976) (holding that a patented radio navigation system requiring
stations for transmitting signals received by receiver infringed under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a),
even though one of three transmitting stations operated outside territorial limits of the

3
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Scenario 3B: Patentee has a U.S. patent on a process and system
for making designs. Onshore Seller has web site in the United
States that offers software for executing the patented process and
system that can be downloaded from Onshore Seller’s U.S. server
to a buyer’s computer. Offshore Buyer downloads the software
from Onshore Seller’s server to Offshore Buyer’s computer.5
Scenario 4: Patentee has a U.S. patent on a system and method for
transferring and transmitting data from a hand-held device.
Onshore Provider offers a service for users outside the United
States of such devices to transfer and transmit data to and from a
relay located within the United States.6
[5] These scenarios illustrate the growing problem of determining when
offshore activities become infringing under U.S. patent law, and especially
what is, or should be, the reach of § 271 to infringing activities that occur
both onshore and offshore. Section II of this article discusses the early
interpretations of the extraterritorial reach of § 271, and especially the
impact of Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.7 Section III of this
article addresses efforts by Congress to plug the holes in § 271 created by
Deepsouth Packing relative to imported and exported products, as well as
other activities outside the United States that may create patent
infringement issues inside the United States. Section IV of this article will
United States). But see Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d 1113 (Fed. Cir.
2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1003 (2004) (ruling that § 271(f)(1) does not apply to chips
designed in United States, but made, sold and shipped to customers abroad); Standard
Havens Prods., Inc. v. Genecor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(finding that patented asphalt making process did not infringe under §§ 271(b), (c) or (f)
by foreign sales of asphalt-making plants).
5
See Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1746; Eolas Techs., 399 F.3d at 1325; see also 35 U.S.C. §
271(f)(2); Kabushiki Kaisha Hattori Sieko v. Refac Tech. Dev. Corp., 690 F.Supp. 1339,
1344 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that foreign seller may be liable for inducement or
contributory infringement under §§ 271(b) or (c) even though seller did not make, use, or
sell product in United States). But see Enpat, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d
1218 (E.D. Va. 1998) (finding that patented method was not infringed under §§ 271(b),
(c) or (f) by foreign sales of software capable of carrying out patented method).
6
See Freedom Wireless, Inc. v. Boston Comm’n. Group, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 11, 18 (D.
Mass. 2002) (finding no infringement where calls for prepaid wireless services for
Canadian consumers were forwarded to and from a central database located in the United
States). See also BlackBerry II, 418 F.3d at 1282. Cf. Decca, 544 F.2d at 1070.
7
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
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then consider the reach of § 271 to infringing activities that can occur
across the cyberspace divide, as well as territorial borders, because of
Internet and other related transnational technologies. Section V of this
article will come back to the above scenarios to see if there is a
comprehensive and consistent approach for applying § 271 to them.
Finally, Section VI of this article will discuss what the appropriate reach
of § 271 should be to infringing activities that have both onshore and
offshore components, i.e., those technologies that “straddle” territorial
borders.
II. DEAD HAND FROM THE EXTRATERRITORIAL INFRINGEMENT GRAVE:
DEEPSOUTH PACKING
[6] Up until 1972, there were few cases, at least at the Supreme Court
level, that commented on the extraterritorial reach of § 271(a) and its
predecessors,8 and then only indirectly. The first allegedly reported case
was Brown v. Duchesne9 in 1857 involving an action brought by the
owner of a U.S. patent on a gaff for a sailing vessel. This action was
against a French national who sailed a French schooner from St. Peters, to
Boston, and back to St. Peters, that contained the allegedly infringing gaff.
8

Section 271 came into being as part of the general patent law reform enacted on July 19,
1952. See Pub. L. 98-417, § 202(e)(1), 98 Stat. 1603 (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 271
(2003)). The key infringement paragraphs of § 271, as the they existed in 1972, are
reproduced as follows:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority
makes, uses, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or
imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of
the patent therefore, infringes the patent; (b) Whoever actively induces
infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer; (c) Whoever
offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United
States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination
or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a
patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing
the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an
infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of
commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a
contributory infringer.
Id.
9
The facts of Brown v. Duchesne and its enunciation of the “temporary presence
doctrine” are extensively discussed in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl.
197, 231 (Fed. Cl. 1993).
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The Supreme Court held there was no infringement based on the
“temporary presence doctrine,”10 but did make the following comments in
passing on the extraterritorial reach of the U.S. patent infringement
statutes:
[T]hese acts of Congress do not, and were not intended to
operate beyond the limits of the United States; and as the
patentee’s right of property and exclusive use is derived
from them, they cannot extend beyond the limits to which
the law itself is confined. And the use of it [a patent right]
outside of the jurisdiction of the United States is not an
infringement of his rights, and he has no claim to any
compensation for the profit or advantage the party may
derive from it.11
[7] In 1915, the Supreme Court in Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline
Plow Co.12 reviewed two decrees involving an accounting of profits and
assessment of damages resulting from the infringement of a U.S. patent on
10

See Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 194 (1856), where the Supreme Court stated the
issue as, “whether any improvement in the construction or equipment of a foreign vessel,
for which a patent has been obtained in the United States, can be used by such vessel
within the jurisdiction of the United States, while she is temporarily there for the
purposes of commerce, without the consent of the patentee?” The “temporary presence
doctrine” is now codified as 35 U.S.C. § 272, which states:
The use of any invention in any vessel, aircraft or vehicle of any
country which affords similar privileges to vessels, aircraft or vehicles
of the United States, entering the United States temporarily or
accidentally, shall not constitute infringement of any patent, if the
invention is used exclusively for the needs of the vessel, aircraft or
vehicle and is not sold in or used for the manufacture of anything to be
sold in or exported from the United States.
35 U.S.C. § 272 (2007).
11
Alan M. Fisch & Brent H. Allen, The Application of Domestic Patent Law to Exported
Software: 35 U.S.C § 271(f), 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L 557, 560 (2004). Even so, the
holding of no infringement in Brown v. Duchesne was squarely based on the “temporary
presence doctrine,” so this passing reference to the extraterritorial reach of the U.S.
infringement statutes was, at most, dicta. See Hughes Aircraft, 29 Fed. Cl. at 232
(discussing how Brown v. Duchesne relied heavily on the view that the amount of “use”
occurring in the United States was minimal and that extension of the patent laws to cover
such a use would seriously undermine Congress’ treaty-making power and interfere with
its power to regulate international commerce).
12
Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650 (1915).
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grain drills. The Supreme Court ruled there could be no recovery of
profits or damages on infringing drills sold in Canada. “The right
conferred by a patent under our law is confined to the United States and its
territories (Rev. Stat. 4884, Comp. Stat. 1913, 9428), and infringement of
this right cannot be predicated of acts wholly done in a foreign country.”13
Real discussion of the extraterritorial reach of § 271(a) did not occur until
1972 with the Supreme Court’s decision in Deepsouth Packing Co. v.
Laitram Corp.14 In fact, subsequent legislative amendments to § 271 can
only be understood against the backdrop of the majority holding, as well
as the dissenting opinion, in Deepsouth Packing.
[8] In Deepsouth Packing, the patent covered a shrimp deveining machine
that comprised several parts. The alleged infringer (Deepsouth Packing)
shipped three separate boxes containing the unassembled parts to foreign
customers that could then assemble these parts into the patented deveining
machines in less than an hour. The district court ruled that the patent was
not infringed, but the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding in favor of the
patentee (Laitram), as well as contrary to rulings in the Second, Third and
Seventh Circuits that had influenced the district court’s decision in favor
of Deepsouth Packing.15
[9] A bare majority of the Supreme Court16 reversed the Fifth Circuit’s
decision, holding in favor of Deepsouth Packing. First, the majority ruled
that the patented invention was not “made” by putting the parts of the
machine into separate boxes.17 Second, in construing then § 271(a), the
majority was unwilling to expand the rights of the patentee without a
“clear and certain signal from Congress.”18 Relying on Brown v.
13

Id. at 650. No reference was made to the case of Brown v. Duchesne.
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
15
Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Link-Belt Co., 371 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1966); Cold Metal
Process Co. v. United Eng’r & Foundry Co., 235 F.2d 224 (3d Cir. 1956); Radio Corp. of
Am. v. Andrea, 79 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1935).
16
The majority opinion was written by Justice White and joined by Justices Douglas,
Brennan, Stewart and Marshall.
17
“We cannot endorse the view that the ‘substantial manufacture of the constituent parts
of [a] machine’ constitutes direct infringement when we have so often held that a
combination patent protects only against the operable assembly of the whole and not the
manufacture of its parts.” Deepsouth Packing Co., 406 U.S. at 528.
14

18
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Duchesne, the majority ruled that “[o]ur patent system makes no claim to
extraterritorial effect” and that “[t]o the degree that the inventor needs
protection in markets other than those of this country” he “should seek it
abroad through patents secured in countries where his goods are being
used.”19
[10] There was a vigorous dissenting opinion by Justice Blackmun20
arguing that the majority’s reading of § 271(a) was “too narrow.”21 The
dissent also showed a pragmatic awareness of and concern regarding what
the majority was ultimately condoning:
[T]he result is unduly to reward the artful competitor who
uses another’s invention in its entirety and who seeks to
profit thereby. Deepsouth may be admissive and candid or,
as the Court describes it, ante, at 523 n. 5,
“straightforward,” in its “sales rhetoric,” ante, at 527, but
for me that rhetoric reveals the very iniquitous and evasive
nature of Deepsouth’s operations. I do not see how one can
escape the conclusion that the Deepsouth machine was
made in the United States, within the meaning of the
protective language of [Sections] 154 and 271(a).22
[11] Many commentators, as well as courts, have pointed to Deepsouth
Packing as reflecting the traditional view that U.S. patent laws generally,
and § 271 specifically, are to be interpreted “strictly” or “narrowly”

“[W]e should not expand patent rights by overruling or modifying our
prior cases construing the patent statutes, [u]nless the argument for
expansion of privilege is based on more than mere inference from
ambiguous statutory language. We would require a clear and certain
signal from Congress before approving the position of a litigant who, as
respondent here, argues that the beachhead of privilege is wider, and
the area of public use narrower, than courts had previously thought. No
such signal legitimizes respondent’s position in this litigation.”
Id. at 531.
19
Id.
20
Justice Blackmun’s dissent was joined by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Powell
and Rehnquist.
21
Deepsouth Packing Co., 406 U.S. at 532.
22
Id. at 531-32.
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regarding extraterritorial effects.23 But a bare majority is hardly a mandate
that § 271(a) should be interpreted “strictly” or “narrowly” to cover only
infringing activities occurring completely within the United States. The
majority’s reliance on Brown v. Duchesne for the proposition that U.S.
patents have no extraterritorial effect is tenuous. One can also sympathize
with the dissent’s instinctive feeling that the majority in Deepsouth
Packing was letting an “evasive” infringer escape liability based on a
“strict” technicality that § 271(a) did not require.24 Even so, the
proposition espoused in Deepsouth Packing that U.S. patent laws have no
“extraterritorial effect” was extended by the courts to infringing acts
23

See, e.g., Daniel P. Homiller, From Deepsouth to the Great White North: The
Extraterritorial Reach of United States Patent Law After Research in Motion, 2005 DUKE
L. & TECH. REV. (No. 17), ¶21 (because of traditional hostility to patent monopoly, the
doctrinal core of Deepsouth Packing is “clear” that courts should construe patent law
conservatively); Joan E. Beckner, Note, Patent Infringement by Component Export:
Waymark Corp. v. Porta Systems Corp. and the Extraterritorial Effect of U.S. Patent
Law, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 803, 812 (2002) (calling Deepsouth Packing a “high-water mark
for the Supreme Court’s strict territorial approach to patent law”); Harold C. Wegner, A
Foreign Square Peg in a Domestic Round Hole: The Eolas-AT&T-Carbide Trilogy,
ENFORCING U.S. PATENTS BEYOND U.S. BORDERS: IMPACT OF RECENT
TERRITORIALITY DECISIONS ON PATENT STRATEGIES (July 18, 2006 panel presentation),
p. 5 (referring to § 271(f)(2) as “very narrow exception” to Deepsouth Packing). See also
Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1364, (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam opinion)
(referring to Deepsouth Packing and Brown v. Duchesne as “consistent with a strict view
of the extra-territoriality principle” and to support interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1498(c) as
“manifesting a Congressional intent to limit infringement actions where conduct by or for
the government sounded abroad”); Decca, 544 F.2d at 1073 (“In the case of the Patent
Laws the canon of hostile interpretation mentioned in the Deepsouth case provides an
added obstacle to implying an extension of the United States Patent Laws to correspond
to the exception implied in Brown v. Duchesne.”).
24

The situation, perhaps, would be different were parts, or even only one
vital part, manufactured abroad. Here everything was accomplished in
this country except putting the pieces together as directed (an operation
that, as Deepsouth represented to its Brazilian prospect, would take
“less than one hour”), all much as the fond father does with his little
daughter's doll house on Christmas Eve. To say that such assembly,
accomplished abroad, is not the prohibited combination and that it
avoids the restrictions of our patent law, is a bit too much for me. The
Court has opened the way to deny the holder of the United States
combination patent the benefits of his invention with respect to sales to
foreign purchasers.
Deepsouth Packing Co., 406 U.S. at 533.

9
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occurring on the high seas25 or in space,26 to infringing products exported
prior to issuance of the patent,27 to exported equipment that could be used
in a patented method,28 or simply to the act of exporting infringing
products.29
[12] The majority ruling in Deepsouth Packing suffers from another
problem, namely its dual personality. On the one hand, this case speaks to
U.S. patent laws generally, and the infringement statutes specifically, as
having no extraterritorial effect.30 On the other hand, this case also stands
25

Ocean Sci. & Eng’r, Inc. v. United States, 595 F.2d 572 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (dictum) (stating
that § 271(a) may not apply to use of underwater device on high seas according to
patented method).
26
Cf. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 197, 243 (Fed. Cl. 1993) (finding
that § 1498 does not apply to activities in space).
27
See The Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Cellpro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding
that injunction could not cover six vials of patented cell line made and exported to
Canada prior to issuance of patent); Robotic Vision Sys. v. View Eng’r, Inc., 39
U.S.P.Q.2d 1117 (C.D. Cal.1995) (holding that § 271(a) does not apply to machines
exported prior to issuance of patent).
28
John Mohr & Sons v. Vacudyne Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1113 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (finding no
infringement under § 271(a) of claimed method where equipment manufactured in the
United States that is capable of carrying out claimed method is sold to foreign customer
for use exclusively in foreign country).
29
Quantum Group, Inc. v. Am. Sensor, Inc., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1436 (D.N. Ill. 1998) (finding
that merely receiving, storing, or shipping infringing products is not “use” under §
271(a)); Amgen, Inc. v. Elanex Pharms., Inc., 1996 WL 84590, *4 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 6,
1996) (holding that shipping product overseas does not infringe patent under § 271(a));
cf. Wesley Jessen Corp. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 228 (D. Del. 2003)
(holding that the export of components of patented lenses did not constitute “use” under §
271(a)). While the accused infringer in Wesley Jessen escaped liability for exporting the
infringing lenses, it was then ensnared under the “offer to sell” language of § 271(a) for
making the offer in the United States to sell the infringing lenses to overseas buyers. See
infra Section III(C).
30
See, e.g., Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp., 823 F.2d 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding
that damages for foreign transactions were excluded because parts of claimed invention
were never operably assembled in United States.); Enka B.V. v. E.I du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 519 F.Supp. 356 (D. Del. 1981) (finding no basis for action under § 271(a) for
activities outside the United States, where no reason to believe that the activities that
arguably infringe patented processes and intermediates will occur in the United States).
Cf. Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam)
(finding no liability by federal government under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) unless all steps of
the patented process were practiced in the United States, noting that “in Deepsouth, the
Supreme Court expressly refused to extend the scope of § 271(a) to capture an
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for the proposition that there must be “direct” infringement of the patented
invention, which can only occur after there is at least one instance of
infringement of the “complete” invention.31 This dual personality is
reflected in subsequent court decisions that have relied on Deepsouth
Packing, and may even have caused some confusion as to what Deepsouth
Packing stands for.32 Subsequent legislative amendments of § 271 have
certainly been affected and burdened by this dual nature.
III. PLUGGING THE GAPS IN SECTION 271 CREATED BY DEEPSOUTH
PACKING
[13] Congress ultimately agreed with the dissenters in Deepsouth
Packing, but not until twelve years later, that § 271 should reach further.
Beginning in 1984 and ending in 1994, Congress enacted a series of
amendments to the existing paragraphs, as well as including additional
paragraphs, that changed the landscape of § 271 as follows (see italicized
language for amendments):
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any
patented invention, within the United States or imports into
extraterritorial manufacture of an infringing device absent express guidance from
Congress.”).
31
See, e.g., Amstar Corp., 823 F.2d at 1546 (excluding damages for foreign transactions
because parts of claimed invention were never operably assembled in the United States);
Akzona, Inc. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. 662 F.Supp. 603, 613 (D. Del. 1987)
(holding that direct infringement must occur within the United States before contributory
infringement liability will lie).
32
Compare Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 774 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing
Deepsouth Packing, 406 U.S. at 526 (1972)) (stating that liability for either active
inducement of infringement or for contributory infringement is dependent upon the
existence of direct infringement,), with Waymark Corp. v. Porta Sys. Corp., 245 F.3d
1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (presenting, as in Deepsouth Packing, the possibility of
giving U.S. patent protection extraterritorial effects). See also Hughes Aircraft, 29 Fed.
Cl. at 219 (referring to the “significant tension between the analysis of the Federal Circuit
in Paper Converting and the analysis of the Supreme Court in [Deepsouth].”). In Paper
Converting, the Federal Circuit found infringement based on an incomplete assembly of
the patented invention in the United States and distinguished Deepsouth Packing on the
grounds that it was “intended to be narrowly construed as applicable only to the issue of
the extraterritorial effect of the American patent law.” Paper Converting Mach. Co. v.
Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 17 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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the United States any patented invention during the term of
the patent therefor, infringes the patent.33
(c) Whoever offers to sell34 or sells within the United States
or imports into the United States a component of a patented
machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a
material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented
process, constituting a material part of the invention,
knowing the same to be especially made or especially
adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a
staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for
substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a
contributory infringer.
(f)(1) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be
supplied in or from the United States all or a substantial
portion of the components of a patented invention, where
such components are uncombined in whole or in part, in
such manner as to actively induce the combination of such
components outside of the United States in a manner that
would infringe the patent if such combination occurred
within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.35
(f)(2) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be
supplied in or from the United States any component of a
patented invention that is especially made or especially
adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial
noninfringing use, where such component is uncombined in
whole or in part, knowing that such component is so made
or adapted and intending that such component will be
combined outside of the United States in a manner that
would infringe the patent if such combination occurred
within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.36
33

Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 533(a)(1) (1994) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271
(2003)).
34
Id. at § 533(a)(2).
35
Pub. L. No. 98-622 § 101(a) (1984).
36
Id.
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(g)
Whoever without authority imports into the United
States or offers to sell, sells, or uses within the United
States a product which is made by a process patented in the
United States shall be liable as an infringer, if the
importation, offer to sell, sale,37 or use of the product
occurs during the term of such process patent. In an action
for infringement of a process patent, no remedy may be
granted for infringement on account of the noncommercial
use or retail sale of a product unless there is no adequate
remedy under this title for infringement on account of the
importation or other use, offer to sell, or sale of that
product. A product which is made by a patented process
will, for purposes of this title, not be considered to be so
made after (1) it is materially changed by subsequent
processes; or
(2) it becomes a trivial and nonessential component
of another product.38
This patchwork of amendments and additions by Congress has forced the
courts, and especially the Federal Circuit, to address the extraterritorial
reach of § 271 as applied to three different types of activities: (a)
exportation from the U.S.; (b) importation into the U.S.; and (c) offers to
sell. Even before Congress began amending § 271 in 1984, the lower
courts, as well as the Federal Circuit, had started to undermine Deepsouth
Packing from an entirely different direction, namely unamended § 271(b)
on inducing infringement. With this legislative and judicial assault on
Deepsouth Packing, the extraterritorial reach of § 271 was about to change
in ways that many back in 1984 could not have predicted. Only recently
has the Supreme Court tried to put some brakes on this judicial assault on
Deepsouth Packing.39

37

The 1994 Amendments inserted “offer to sell.” Pub. L. No. 103-465 § 544(a)(4)
(1994).
38
Pub. L. No. 100-418 § 9003 (1988).
39
See infra notes 81-102 for a discussion of the Supreme Court’s decision in Microsoft
Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct 1746 (2007).
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A. EXPORTING FROM THE UNITED STATES
[14] The legislative assault began with the enactment in 1984 of what
became §§ 271(f)(1) and 271(f)(2)40 to directly plug the extraterritorial
gap created by Deepsouth Packing on exportation of unassembled
components of patented inventions.41
40

Pub. L. 98-622 § 101(f) (1984). Sections 271(f)(1) and 271(f)(2) apply only to “the
supplying, or causing to be supplied, of any component or components of a patented
invention” after November 8, 1984. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2003). In 1988, Congress enacted
what became § 271(g) to cover products made by a U.S. patented process. See infra
section III B. While § 271(g) is primarily directed at the importation of such products, its
language could also be construed to cover such products if they are simply offered for
sale, sold or used in the United States, whether or not those products were imported. See
35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (“Whoever . . . offers to sell, sells or uses within the United States a
product which is made by a process patented in the United States shall be liable as an
infringer, if the . . . offer to sell, sale or use of the product occurs during the term of such
process patent.”) (emphasis added). Interestingly, there do not appear to be any reported
cases that have construed § 271(g) in a situation involving non-imported products. See
Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1374 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (suggesting the possibility that § 271(g) covers only importation of products made
by patented process). The Federal Circuit early on also held that § 271(f) does not apply
retroactively. See Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp., 823 F.2d 1538, 1546 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (excluding damages for foreign transactions because parts of the claimed invention
were never operably assembled in the United States).
41
There is no consensus among the commentators as to whether § 271(f) was intended by
Congress to be a “major change” or a “minor tweak” relative to Deepsouth Packing.
Compare Fisch & Allen, supra note 11, at 566-67 (according to legislative history of §
271(f), Congress made “major change” in patent law by overruling the holding of
Deepsouth Packing to provide a “clear and certain signal from Congress.”), with Wegner,
supra note 23, at 2 (citing the “narrowly crafted statutory tweak” to § 271 in 1984). See
also Virginia Zaunbrecher, Note, Eolas, AT&T, & Union Carbide: The New
Extraterritoriality of U.S. Patent Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 33, 56 (2006) (“While
legislative history and context argue against this expansion, it could, on the other hand,
be asserted that patent law should be altered to fit new technologies and that the Federal
Circuit was doing just that in these cases. It is important to remember, however, that
even if the legislative history is not dispositive, the impact on international law and
domestic industry also counsels against giving 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) a more expansive
definition than that which existed at its enactment.”); Beckner supra note 23, at 831-32
(“On one hand, the legislative history suggests that Congress intended merely to overturn
Deepsouth’s [sic] contentious result, to protect patentees from bad actors desiring to
circumvent U.S. patents by shipping easily assembled modular parts, instead of operably
assembled infringing products, abroad. On the other hand, Congress’s expansion of the
statutory language beyond Deepsouth’s [sic] facts—for example, by adding ‘or causes to
supply’ and ‘any’ or ‘a substantial portion’ of the components—suggests a more focused
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The only language §§ 271(f)(1) and 271(f)(2) share in common is at the
beginning and end. Otherwise, these two sections differ greatly and, in
fact, cover different types of infringing activity. Section 271(f)(1)
addresses “inducing infringement” activity like that of § 271(b),42 but
unlike § 271(b), requires that “all or a substantial portion of the
components of the patented invention” be supplied or caused to be
supplied by the alleged infringer. By contrast, § 271(f)(2) addresses
“contributory infringement” activity like that of § 271(c).43 In fact, §
271(f)(2) borrows the language of § 271(c) in requiring that the
component of the patented invention be “especially made or especially
adapted for use in the invention,” and “not a staple article or commodity of
commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use.” Like § 271(c), §
271(f)(2) also requires the alleged infringer to “[know] that such
component is so made or adapted and [intend] that such component will be
combined outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe.”
[15] Sections 271(f)(1) and 271(f)(2) are also unique in another regard
relative to §§ 271(b) and 271(c). Neither § 271(f)(1) nor § 271(f)(2)
require a separate act of direct infringement.44
Put differently,
infringement liability can occur under either § 271(f)(1) or § 271(f)(2),
effort to extend liability beyond mere U.S.-made kit assembly to include true foreign
manufacture.”).
42
“Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.” 35
U.S.C. § 271(b). Intent to induce infringement under § 271(f)(1) may be shown by
circumstantial evidence. Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., Inc., 449 F.3d 1209,
1222-23 (2006) (finding that intent to induce infringement was shown by the knowledge
of the patent by accused infringer, and the sending of manuals by accused infringer to
customers with instructions to install system according to the patented design).
43

Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into
the United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture,
combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in
practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the
invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially
adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial
noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
44
See Waymark Corp. v. Porta Sys. Corp., 245 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001). See also
Dariush Keyhani, U.S. Patent Law and Extraterritorial Reach, 7 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 51, 57 (2005).
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whether or not the patented invention is ever completed. That is what the
Federal Circuit finally held in the 2001 case of Waymark Corp. v. Porta
Systems Corp., when it ruled that § 271(f)(2) does not require an actual
combination of components, but only a showing that those components
were shipped “with intent that they be combined.”45
[16] Waymark confirmed that the second pillar of the holding in
Deepsouth Packing, that liability requires proof of infringement of the
completed invention, was removed by §§ 271(f)(2) and 271(f)(1).46 In
fact, the Federal Circuit’s acknowledgement in Waymark that § 271(f)(2)
only requires “an intent to combine” greatly altered the traditional concept
in U.S. patent infringement jurisprudence that liability must be based on
proof of at least one act of “direct infringement” of the patented invention.
That being said, Waymark did not directly challenge the first pillar of
Deepsouth Packing, namely that U.S. patent laws do not have an
extraterritorial reach.47 Instead, this first pillar was to be undermined in a
more subtle way.
[17] This subtle erosion resulted from the meaning of one word that
appears multiple times in both §§ 271(f)(1) and 271(f)(2):
“component(s).” Indeed, most of the court decisions, including those of
the Federal Circuit, revolve around what the term “component(s)” in §§
271(f)(1) and 271(f)(2) means, and whether this term should be construed
strictly (i.e., narrowly) or more broadly. A stricter or narrower
construction of “component(s)” accepts the view that §§ 271(f)(1) and
45

Waymark, 245 F.3d at 1368. For an excellent review of this determination, as well as
other aspects of the Waymark case, see Beckner, supra note 23.
46
See Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 144 F. Supp. 2d 188, 195 (W.D.N.Y.
2001) (stating that a party who supplies “all or substantial portion of the components” for
foreign assembly can infringe under § 271(f)(1) “regardless of whether that party enlisted
the aid of a third-party.”) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
47
See Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. Fred Ostermann GmbH, 668 F. Supp. 812 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (finding that § 271(f) applies only to components manufactured within the United
States, and not to foreign manufactured items such as French-made sailboards transferred
from the United States to Canada after items were held to be infringing). But see Moore,
144 F. Supp. 2d at 195. Moore, which preceded Waymark, is perhaps the only example
of § 271(f) being given true extraterritorial effect in that the accused infringer brought the
necessary components (paper, glue, and blueprints) from the United States to Switzerland
and then assembled these components in the infringing form (a C-fold mailer) abroad. Id.
at 193.
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271(f)(2) address and remedy only the specific gap created by Deepsouth
Packing.48 Because the invention in Deepsouth Packing involved a
machine (a shrimp deveiner), the “strict construction” view says that
Congress intended “component(s)” in §§ 271(f)(1) and 271(f)(2) to refer
only to a “machine” or components of similar devices.49 In fact, this
“strict construction” view was adopted by several courts when ruling that
§§ 271(f)(1) and 271(f)(2) do not apply to design patents,50 as well as
process or method patents.51
[18] The problem with strictly construing “component(s)” as referring
only to those of machines and similar devices involved in Deepsouth
Packing is that §§ 271(f)(1) and 271(f)(2) refer to these “component(s)” in
terms of a “patented invention.” In fact, in companion § 271(e),52 the term

48

See Wegner, supra note 23.
See T.D. Williamson, Inc. v. Laymon, 723 F. Supp. 587 (N.D. Okla. 1989) (supplying
components from the United States to Venezuela for use in patented “caliper pig”
infringes under § 271(f)(1)). See also Donald S. Chisum, Normative and Empirical
Territoriality in Intellectual Property: Lessons From Patent Law, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 603,
607 (1997) (stating that § 271(f) does not cover manufacture and export of a component
for use in a patented process); Steven C. Tietsworth, Comment, Exporting Software
Components: Finding a Role for Software in 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1), 42 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 405, 436-37 (2005) (proposing the argument that § 271(f) was enacted specifically
in response to Deepsouth Packing, which involved only the manufacture, sale and
assembly of mechanical machine parts).
50
Aerogroup Int’l v. Marlboro Footworks, 955 F. Supp. 220, 231-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(holding that § 271(f) is a specific and targeted exception to the fact that patent protection
generally extends only within the United States and is inapplicable to design patents
because a design for a shoe sole has no component parts).
51
Enpat, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 6 F. Supp. 2d 537, 537 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that
foreign sales of software products do not infringe method patents under § 271(f)(2)).
52
Hatch-Waxman Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006) (stating in relevant part: “It shall not
be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States or
import into the United States a patented invention (other than a new animal drug or
veterinary biological product (as those terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913) which is primarily manufactured using
recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes
involving site specific genetic manipulation techniques) solely for uses reasonably related
to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates
the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.”) (emphasis
added).
49

17

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIV, Issue 1

“patented invention” has been construed very broadly.53 Additionally, the
vast majority of courts, including the Federal Circuit, have now construed
“patented invention” broadly in §§ 271(f)(1) and 271(f)(2).54 For
example, the term “component(s)” has been held to cover chemical
components in patented chemical compositions55 as well as chemical
components used in a patented process.56
53

See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665-79 (1990) (holding that the
immunity provided by the Hatch-Waxman Act also applies to medical devices).
Originally, it was believed that the Hatch-Waxman Act only applied to testing secure
regulatory approval of a patented drug. Id. In view of the Supreme Court’s holding in
Medtronic, this immunity should now be applicable to the testing of any patented
invention (e.g., food additives or cosmetics) for the purpose of securing regulatory
approval from the FDA. See Eric W. Guttag, Immunizing University Research From
Patent Infringement: The Implications of Madey v. Duke University, 15 J. ASSOC. OF
UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS 1, 10 (Dec. 2003).
54
See Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(stating that § 271(f)(1) uses the broad and inclusive term “patented invention.”).
55
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 2001 WL 1263299 at *2
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that “component” § 271(f) applies to chemical compositions);
W.R. Grace & Co. Conn. v. Intercat, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d 316, 320-21 (D. Del. 1999)
(holding that “component” of § 271(f) applies to chemical compositions); Lubrizol Corp.
v. Exxon Corp., 696 F.Supp. 302, 325 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (enjoining defendant from
“supplying in or from” the United States any lubricant additive containing defendant’s
product for combination in lubricating compositions outside the United States).
56
Union Carbide Chem. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 425 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (supplying the catalyst for use abroad by foreign affiliate in patented process
infringes under § 271(f)). In Union Carbide, the Federal Circuit treated its ruling that
“patented invention” included patented processes as almost being “matter of fact.” Id.
The potential inconsistency with prior Federal Circuit precedent, as well as district court
decisions, belie this “matter of fact” attitude in Union Carbide. See Synaptic Pharm.
Corp. v. MDS Panlabs, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d 452, 464 (D.N.J. 2002) (finding that liability
under § 271(f) does not extend to alleged infringer’s activities regarding patented assay
process); Enpat, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 537 (holding that foreign sales of software products do
not infringe method patents § 271(f)(2)); cf. Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor
Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that the sale of asphalt plant
to foreign customer did not infringe method patent because there was no evidence that
foreign customer used plant in the United States or shipped products back to the United
States in violation of § 271(g); infringement under § 271(f) was not discussed). Even
more startling is that none of these earlier cases are even mentioned in Union Carbide.
See also infra notes 100-102 and accompanying text which discuss how the Supreme
Court’s decision in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007) might be
viewed with regard to the meaning of “component” and which might undermine the
holding in Union Carbide.
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[19] Perhaps the most important application of §§ 271(f)(1) and 271(f)(2),
and the one potentially creating the greatest controversy so far on
extraterritorial reach, is to exported computer software.57 When Congress
enacted §§ 271(f)(1) and 271(f)(2), it was unlikely they had exported
software in mind. Software has a somewhat multi-faceted character. On
the one hand, software has the primary attributes of a “process.” On the
other hand, software may potentially be a “product” when it is recorded or
copied to hardware, such as a hard disk, floppy disk or CD-ROM.
Because of this multi-faceted character, classifying software as a
“component” under §§ 271(f)(1) and 271(f)(2) is not as straightforward as
it would initially seem. In addition, and unlike other “components,” the
ease with which software may be copied, replicated and/or transmitted
creates interpretational challenges as to when software is “supplied” or
“caused to be supplied” under these sections.
[20] The application of §§ 271(f)(1) and 271(f)(2) to exported software
has been the focus of four cases, each involving the software giant
Microsoft as the alleged infringer. The first was the 1998 case of Enpat,
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.58 which went in favor of Microsoft. In Enpat, the
Eastern District of Virginia held that foreign sales of Microsoft’s Project
and Team Manager software did not infringe a patented method for a
project manager server system under § 271(f)(2), saying:
[H]ad Congress intended to prohibit U.S. companies from
exporting products which allow foreign companies to make
unauthorized use of patented methods, it could have done
so in clear, unambiguous language like that found in §
271(g). Instead, we agree with Microsoft that the language
and legislative history of § 271(f) demonstrate an exclusive
focus on the sale of components patented in the United

57

See generally Fisch & Allen, supra note 11; Wegner, supra note 23; Keith E. Witek,
Software Patent Infringement on the Internet and on Modern Computer Systems - Who Is
Liable for Damages?, 14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 303 (1998);
Teitsworth, supra note 49; William R. Thornewell II, Note, Patent Infringement
Prevention and the Advancement of Technology: Application of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) to
Software and “Virtual Components,” 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2815 (2005); Zaunbrecher,
supra note 41.
58
Enpat, Inc v. Microsoft Corp., 6 F. Supp. 2d 537 (E.D.Va. 1998).
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States for combination into a finished product, apparatus, or
invention abroad.59
The argument that the patent described “specific components which might
be assembled abroad, for example a central computer server, remote
terminals, and other computer equipments envisioned by the patented
method” was found unconvincing. While the patented method might
involve “physical objects,” it remained a “method patent” outside the
“purview of § 271(f)” according to the Eastern District of Virginia.60
[21] Microsoft’s initial victory in Enpat appeared to be short lived.
Beginning in 2003, Microsoft lost the second and third cases applying §
271(f) to exported software. Each of these cases involved “golden master”
disks that contained Microsoft’s software source codes. These “golden
master” disks were exported to foreign computer manufacturers and
served as a “template” for replication of the source code, usually on the
hard drive of a new computer. As such, the “golden master” disk never
became part of the new computer.
[22] In the second case, Imagexpo, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp.,61 Microsoft
had exported “golden master” disks containing its NetMeeting software.
The patentee (Imagexpo) alleged that Microsoft’s export of these “golden
master” disks infringed Imagexpo’s patented method and apparatus for
interactive conferencing under § 271(f).62 In a motion to limit damages,
Microsoft sought to exclude those damages based on replicating the
exported “golden master” disks outside the United States. Naturally,
Microsoft relied heavily on the Enpat case, and given that the ruling court
was again the Eastern District of Virginia, Microsoft probably expected
these “foreign replication” damages to be excluded. Instead, the Eastern
District of Virginia accepted Imagexpo’s argument that, unlike Enpat, the
computer code on these “golden master” disks had become an “integral
59

Id. at 539.
Later Federal Circuit rulings, such as Union Carbide and Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell
Oil Co., find that § 271(f) does apply to patented processes; therefore, whether Enpat
remains good law is open to question. But see infra note 97 questioning how much of
Eolas and Imagexpo cases remain good law in view of the Supreme Court’s decision in
the Microsoft case.
61
Imagexpo, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 299 F. Supp. 2d 550 (E.D.Va. 2003).
62
U.S. Patent No. 5,206,934 (filed Aug. 15, 1989).
60
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ingredient of the finished computer product,” and held that these “golden
master” disks were a “component” under § 271(f), making Microsoft
liable for these “foreign replication” damages.63
[23] Microsoft fared no better with the Federal Circuit in the third case,
Eolas Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.64 In Eolas, “golden master”
disks containing Microsoft’s Windows source code with Internet Explorer
were exported and replicated abroad. Once again, Microsoft sought to
exclude damages based on these “foreign replications” of the “golden
master” disks. In ruling that software code was a “component” under §
271(f)(1), Judge Rader’s opinion for the Federal Circuit relied heavily on
the phrase “patented invention” used in this section with reference to
“components.” Rather than being restrictive, “patented invention” was a
“broad and inclusive term” and not limited to patented “machines” or
patented “physical structures.”65 In observing that “[e]xact duplicates of
the software code on the golden master disk are incorporated as an
operating element of the ultimate device,” Judge Rader held that “[t]his
operating element in effect drives the ‘functional nucleus of the finished
computer product’” and cited with approval the Imagexpo case.66
[24] Then came the fourth and final case, AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft
Corp.,67 involving Microsoft’s Windows software containing a patented
program for coding a speech signal. As in Eolas, this Windows software
was supplied abroad to foreign “replicators” on a limited number of
“golden master” disks referred to as “master versions.” These foreign
63

Imagexpo, 299 F. Supp. 2d at 553.
Eolas Tech., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
65
Id. at 1340. Microsoft argued that the Federal Circuit’s decision in Pellegrini v.
Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d 1113 (Fed. Cir. 2004) which held that § 271 (f)(1) does
not reach chips designed in the United States but made, sold and shipped to customers
abroad, imposed a “tangibility” requirement under § 271(f), i.e., the “components” must
be “physical components.” Id. at 1340-41. The Federal Circuit distinguished Pellegrini,
saying that it held only that the “components” be physically supplied from the United
States. Id. at 1340-41. Accord, Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 7-10, AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (No.
05-1056) (containing a concurrence by the U.S. Solicitor General that software may be a
component of a patented invention under § 271(f)).
66
Eolas Techs., 399 F.3d at 1339 (citing Imagexpo, 299 F. Supp. 2d at 553).
67
AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The Federal
Circuit’s decision will be referred to as AT&T.
64
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“replicators” generated multiple copies from each exported “master
version” and then installed these generated copies of the Windows
software on foreign-assembled machines.68
[25] Unlike Eolas, these “master versions” of the software were also
supplied in at least some instances by electronic transmission to these
foreign “replicators.” Another twist in the AT&T case was a new
argument by Microsoft, that these “foreign” generated copies were not
“supplied” from the United States within the meaning of § 271(f).69 Judge
Lourie, writing for a majority of the Federal Circuit panel, acknowledged
that replication of software abroad from a master version exported with
“intent that it be replicated” abroad was a question of first impression.70
Even so, the Federal Circuit majority held that such “foreign-replicated
copies” were “supplied” within the meaning of § 271(f), even if only a
single copy was sent abroad with the intent that it be replicated.71
[26] The Federal Circuit majority reached this conclusion based on a
pragmatic assessment of how software was typically “supplied.” As the
Federal Circuit majority saw it, “the ‘supplying’ of software commonly
involves generating a copy.”72 Because “it is inherent in the nature of
software that one can supply only a single disk that may be replicated,” the
Federal Circuit majority further concluded that all “resulting copies have
essentially been supplied from the United States.”73
[27] The Federal Circuit majority also had no difficulty in applying §
271(f) to software sent by electronic transmission for replication abroad.
68

Id. at 1368.
Id.
70
Id. at 1369.
71
Id. at 1370.
72
Id. Judge Lourie used the example of downloading software from a server to a user’s
computer, stating,
[f]or example, when a user downloads software from a server on the
Internet, the server ‘supplies’ the software to the user’s computer by
transmitting an exact copy. Uploading a single copy to the server is
sufficient to allow any number of exact copies to be downloaded and
hence ‘supplied.’ Copying, therefore, is part and parcel of software
distribution.
Id.
73
Id.
69
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Relying on Eolas for the proposition that § 271(f) is not limited to
“structural or physical” components, the Federal Circuit majority said,
“[w]hether software is sent abroad via electronic transmission or shipped
abroad on a ‘golden master’ disk is a distinction without a difference for
the purposes of § 271(f) liability. Liability under § 271(f) is not premised
on the mode of exportation, but rather the fact of exportation.”74
[28] Judge Rader, author of the Eolas opinion, dissented.75 As far as
Judge Rader was concerned, “the act of supplying” software was “separate
and distinct from copying, reproducing or manufacturing” software to
generate additional copies.76 Judge Rader considered the majority holding
in AT&T to be an “extraterritorial expansion of U.S. patent law” that
“contravenes the precedent of this court and the Supreme Court.”77 Judge
Rader was also concerned that this “extraterritorial expansion” of § 271(f)
improperly invaded “foreign patent sovereignty.”78
74

Id. at 1371.
One might wonder how Judge Rader, who authored the opinion in Eolas, could dissent
in AT&T. The answer lies in construing Eolas as applying § 271(f) only to the original
exported “golden master” disk, and not the copies generated from that “golden master”
disk. See id. at 1370. In fact, Judge Rader apparently agreed with the majority that
electronic transmission of software must be treated the same under § 271(f) as software
shipped on disks. Id. at 1375.
76
Id. at 1373. In partially supporting Microsoft’s petition for certiorari in the AT&T case,
the U.S. Solicitor General agreed with and adopted Judge Rader’s view that the
additional copies were not “supplied” from the United States, but were replicated abroad
from the “golden master” disk and thus outside the scope of § 271(f). See Brief for
United States, supra note 65, at 10-14.
77
AT&T, 414 F.3d at 1373. The “precedent” that Judge Rader referred to as being
“contravened” included the Supreme Court’s decision in Deepsouth Packing and the
Federal Circuit’s decision in Pellegrini. Id. at 1376.
78
See id. at 1376. Judge Rader stated, “[t]his court should accord proper respect to the
clear language of the statute and to foreign patent regimes by limiting the application of §
271(f) to components literally ‘shipped from the United States,’” Id. (citing Pelligrini).
Accord Brief for Fédération Internationale Des Counseils En Propriété Industrielle as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, AT&T, 414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (arguing
that the affirmance of the Federal Circuit majority in AT&T “undercuts the ability of
other nations to enforce patent systems of their own design.”). Throughout his dissenting
opinion, Judge Rader used the example of copies being made in Düsseldorf, Germany
and Tokyo, Japan from the exported “golden master” disk, and argued that the remedy for
such copying must be under German or Japanese law. AT&T, 414 F.3d at 1372-76. The
problem with this argument is that there might not be a “remedy” because certain
countries, such as Germany, do not recognize patent rights in software.
75
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[29] In applying § 271(f) to “foreign-replicated” copies of exported
software, the Federal Circuit majority in AT&T may have extended the
extraterritorial reach of § 271(f). But whether this “extraterritorial
extension” contravened precedent or was contrary to the intent of § 271(f)
is debatable.79 In interpreting § 271(f) as it did, the Federal Circuit
majority may have heeded the warning of the dissenters in Deepsouth
Packing. By contrast, Judge Rader’s restrictive dissenting view opened a
huge “gap” in § 271(f) that might well nullify any realistic effort by a
patentee to control the export of software intended for replication and use
abroad in its U.S. “patented invention.”80

79

Compare Fisch & Allen, supra note 11 (“With § 271(f), Congress specifically
extended the reach of U.S. patent law beyond the borders of this country.”), with Brief for
United States, supra note 65, at 16-17 (taking the position that the imposition of liability
by the Federal Circuit majority conflicts with the “presumption against extraterritorial
effect” expressed in Deepsouth Packing).
80
There is a valid countervailing argument that too expansive an application of § 271(f)
may put U.S. exporting companies at a competitive disadvantage to foreign competitors
and thus drive them offshore. See Chisum, supra note 49, at 607 (stating the “most
immediate effect is to create one more incentive for U.S. companies who compete in
foreign markets to move their manufacturing facilities abroad.”). In supporting
Microsoft’s petition for certiorari in the AT&T case, the U.S. Solicitor General took up a
similar argument:
Under the [Federal Circuit’s] decision, companies that design software
in the United States cannot distribute their software abroad without
running the risk that they will be compelled to pay royalties under
United States patent law with respect to all of their foreign sales. Their
foreign competitors, by contrast, run no such risk of global liability
under United States law, because they are exempt from application of
Section 271(f) with respect to their foreign conduct. As a result, United
States software companies will find themselves at a substantial
competitive disadvantage in foreign markets, and may even be
foreclosed from competing in those markets altogether. That
disadvantage will harm the software sector of the American economy
and could ultimately compel some software companies to relocate their
research and development operations abroad.
Brief for United States, supra note 65, at 17-18 (citation omitted). Others have echoed
this or a similar concern. See Brief Amici Curiae of Intellectual Property Professors in
Support of Reversal, Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007) (05-1056),
2006 WL 3740618; Brief for Business Software Alliance as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007) (05-1056), 2006 WL
3740 363; Brief of Intel Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Microsoft Corp.
v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007) (05-1056), 2006 WL 3740361; Brief of the
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[30] The Federal Circuit majority in AT&T might have also been more
prudent to simply rely on the Waymark case in applying § 271(f) to
exported software, while stopping short of the “extraterritorial effect”
quagmire. But instead, the Federal Circuit majority fell into this quagmire
by saying “Congress obviously intended the statute [i.e., § 271(f)] to have
Indeed, the Supreme Court granted
an extraterritorial effect.”81
Microsoft’s petition for certiorari82 at least in some measure because of the
view expressed by Microsoft and supporting Amicus Briefs that the
Federal Circuit majority opinion, in applying § 271(f) to exported software
replicated abroad, caused an impermissible “extraterritorial effect.”83
Software & Information Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Microsoft Corp.
v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007) (05-1056), 2006 WL 3740362.
81
AT&T, 414 F.3d at 1371. Because Waymark had already construed § 271(f)(2) not to
require “direct infringement” for liability to attach, the Federal Circuit majority in AT&T
did not need to construe § 271(f) as having an “extraterritorial effect.” Instead, the
Federal Circuit majority in AT&T might have based its holding strictly on software sent
from the United States with “intent to replicate” that software outside the United States
on new computers to infringe the patented invention. But strangely, the Federal Circuit
majority in AT&T makes no mention of Waymark. On the other hand, the patentee,
AT&T, showed a complete understanding that Waymark construed § 271(f) as not
requiring an “extraterritorial effect,” and therefore characterized Microsoft’s
“extraterritoriality” argument as a “red-herring.” See Brief in Opposition to Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit at 21, Microsoft
Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S.Ct. 467 (2006) (No. 05-1056). This view was also echoed
in AT&T’s main brief. See Brief of Respondent at 35-36, 41-42, Microsoft Corp. v.
AT&T Corp., 127 S.Ct. 467 (2006) (No. 05-1056) (arguing that liability attaches even if
component never actually combined abroad, so long as defendant intends such
combination to take place; Microsoft is liable under 35 U.S.C §271(f) not for
“extraterritorial” conduct but for conduct performed domestically).
82
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 467 (U.S. 2006).
83
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in support of Petitioner at 16, AT&T
v. Microsoft Corp. 414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (No. 05-1056) (stating that the
imposition of liability by the Federal Circuit majority conflicts with the “presumption
against extraterritoriality” as expressed in Deepsouth Packing). All Amicus Briefs filed
in the AT&T case completely or partially supported Microsoft’s position. The Software
and Information Industry Association, the Software Freedom Law Center, Yahoo,
Autodesk, the Business Software Alliance, and Intel, each filed Amicus Briefs supporting
Microsoft’s position that software is not a “component” under § 271(f), and that
exported software that is “replicated” abroad is not “supplied” or “caused to be supplied”
under § 271(f). While supporting Microsoft’s position that exported software that is
“replicated” abroad is not “supplied” or “caused to be supplied” under § 271(f), the
Solicitor General and AIPLA also agreed with the position of the Federal Circuit majority
and AT&T that software can be a “component” under § 271(f). The Amicus Brief filed
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[31] On April 30, 2007, the Supreme Court in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T
Corp. (by a margin of 7 to 1)84 agreed with dissenting Judge Rader’s
restrictive view of § 271(f) and reversed the Federal Circuit majority.85
The Supreme Court held that, because the exported copies of Microsoft’s
Windows software were not installed on foreign-made computers,
Microsoft did not “supply” from the United States a “component” of the
patented invention within the meaning of § 271(f).86
[32] In reversing the Federal Circuit majority, the Supreme Court87
conceded that “[p]lausible arguments can be made for and against
extending § 271(f) to” Microsoft’s conduct.88 But the Supreme Court
ruled that “[b]ecause Microsoft does not export from the United States the
copies actually installed [on foreign computers], it does not ‘suppl[y]…
from the United States’” the “‘components’ of the [foreign] computers.”89
Accordingly, Microsoft was “not liable under § 271(f) as currently
written.”90
[33] The Supreme Court would have been on firm ground if it had simply
stopped there with its opinion. That Congress did not contemplate a
“copy” of a replicated exported item (i.e., software) as “supplying” a
“component” from the United States under § 271(f) was certainly a
by Intellectual Property Professors agreed with Microsoft’s position that exported
software that is “replicated” abroad is not “supplied” or “caused to be supplied” under §
271(f), but was silent on whether software may be a “component” under § 271(f). Shell
Oil Company, on the losing side in the Union Carbide case (see supra note 56 and
accompanying text), filed an Amicus Brief in support of Microsoft’s position, but on a
slightly different ground, namely that process steps and other intangible information (e.g.,
software) is not a “component” that can be “supplied” under § 271(f).
84
Chief Justice Roberts did not participate in the consideration or decision. Microsoft,
127 S. Ct. at 1760.
85
Id. at 1746. The Supreme Court’s decision will be referred to as the Microsoft case.
86
Id. at 1751. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Microsoft is equally applicable to
Microsoft’s exported master version disks replicated abroad or electronic transmissions
abroad of Microsoft’s master version. Id. at 1754 n. 9.
87
The opinion for the Supreme Court was written by Justice Ginsburg and joined by
Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Souter. Id. at 1750. Justice Alito wrote a concurring
opinion, joined by Justices Thomas and Breyer which concurred as to all but footnote 14
of the Court’s opinion. Id. Justice Stevens submitted a separate dissenting opinion. Id.
88
Id. at 1751
89
Id.
90
Id.
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reasonable and supportable outcome. In fact, the Supreme Court observed
that “no one in this litigation argues that software can never rank as a
‘component’ under § 271(f).”91 But the Supreme Court went further down
a problematic “fork in the logic path” and may have plunged into water
over its head.
[34] This “fork in the logic path” was this: (1) “one could speak of
software in the abstract;” or (2) “one can alternatively envision a tangible
‘copy’ of software, the instructions encoded on a medium such as a CDROM.”92 As the Supreme Court saw it, only the later form (copy of the
software encoded on a medium) can be a “component” under § 271(f)
because “abstract software code is an idea without physical embodiment,
and as such, it does not match § 271(f)’s categorization: ‘components’
amenable to ‘combination.’”93 The Supreme Court also characterized
“abstracted software” such as Microsoft’s Windows as “a detailed set of
instructions – and thus might be compared to a blueprint (or anything
containing design information).”94 The Supreme Court then concluded by
saying that “a blueprint may contain precise instructions for the
construction and combination of the components of a patented device, but
it is not itself a combinable component” of that device.95
[35] For those skilled in computer science and software development, the
Supreme Court’s comparison of software code to a “set of blueprints” is
hardly apt or accurate.96 Software code does more than simply provide a
91

Id. at 1754. In other words, the Supreme Court majority at least accepted the Federal
Circuit majority’s position, as well as the Federal Circuit’s earlier holding in Eolas, that
software, in some form, can qualify as a “component” under § 271(f). See id. at n.10.
92
Id. at 1754.
93
Id. at 1748.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
The inaptness of the Supreme Court’s comparison of software to a blueprint was
pointed out clearly by the dissenting Justice Stevens: “[a]nd unlike a blueprint that
merely instructs a user how to do something, software actually causes infringing conduct
to occur. It is more like a roller that causes a player piano to produce sound than sheet
music that tells a pianist what to do.” See id. at 1763 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In fact,
Justice Steven’s analogy to the punched roller used with a player piano is a much more
apt description of how software works than the Supreme Court majority’s description of
software as a set of blueprint instructions is. See Wikipedia.org, Jacquard Loom,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacquard_Loom (last visited Oct. 23, 2007) (describing the
Jacquard loom invented by Joseph Marie Jacquard in 1801, which used holes punched in
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set of instructions, but instead “drives the functional nucleus of the
finished computer product.”97 In other words, as AT&T, the Respondent,
argued, “software, unlike a blueprint is ‘dynamic.’”98
[36] The Supreme Court also got it somewhat muddled regarding the
primary function of software when it said “before software can be
contained in and continuously performed by a computer . . . an actual,
physical copy of the software must be delivered by CD-ROM or some
other means capable of interfacing with the computer.”99 The primary
function of software is not that it is “performed by the computer.” Instead,
it is the ability of software to cause the computer to perform and operate
according to the instructions supplied by the software.
[37] More significantly, the Supreme Court’s view that the “software
code” must somehow be encoded on a medium (e.g., something physical)
to be a “component” under § 271(f) is not compelled by the express
language of this statute. There is absolutely no reference in § 271(f) to the
“component” having to be embodied in a medium. The dissent also
disagreed with the Supreme Court majority’s opinion that software, even
in an “abstract set of instructions,” must be associated with a medium,
physical or otherwise, to be a “component” under § 271(f). “Whether
attached or detached from any medium, software plainly satisfies the
dictionary definition of that word.”100
[38] But the Supreme Court majority may have taken an even greater
misstep by getting into the “extraterritorial effect” quagmire. While the
Federal Circuit majority may have initially fallen into this quagmire, the
pasteboard where the punched card corresponded to one row of the design and where the
cards were strung together in order). The Jacquard loom was the predecessor of the
computer punch cards used in the early IBM computers. See Wikipedia.com, History of
Computing Hardware, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_computing_hardware (last
visited Oct. 24, 2007).
97
Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing
Imagexpo, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 299 F. Supp. 2d 550, 553 (E.D. Va. 2003), and
which is referred to by the Supreme Court in Microsoft). How much of the Eolas and
Imagexpo cases remain good law after Microsoft (other than that software may be a
“component”) is unclear.
98
Microsoft, 127 S.Ct. at 1755.
99
Id. at 1756.
100
Id. at 1763 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Supreme Court majority unfortunately jumped right in after them. “Any
doubt that Microsoft’s conduct falls outside § 271(f)’s compass would be
resolved by the presumption against extraterritoriality.”101 While AT&T
argued (based on the Waymark case) that this “presumption” was not in
play because § 271(f) “applies only to domestic conduct,” the Supreme
Court majority disagreed. Instead, the Supreme Court majority sided with
the U.S. Solicitor General’s Amicus Brief and Judge Rader’s dissent that
AT&T’s reading “converts a single act of supply from the United States
into a springboard for liability each time a copy of the software is
subsequently made [abroad] and combined with computer hardware
[abroad] for sale [abroad.]”102 That Congress in 1984, and as accepted by
the Federal Circuit in 2001 in the Waymark case, may have altered the
traditional concept in U.S. patent infringement jurisprudence espoused in
Deepsouth Packing that liability must be based on proof of “direct
infringement” of the patented invention seems to be completely lost on the
Supreme Court majority in Microsoft.103
[39] It remains to be seen how the Federal Circuit, and especially the
district courts will apply the Supreme Court’s interpretation of § 271(f) in
the Microsoft case. For one thing, there was no agreement by a majority
of the Supreme Court as to whether an exported disk with software
directly loaded onto a foreign-made computer would give rise to liability
under § 271(f).104 In addition, while the Microsoft decision was directed
101

Id. at 1749. The Supreme Court majority cited to F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd v.
Empagran S. A., 542 U. S. 155, 164 (2004) (holding that an exception in Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvement Act does not apply to Sherman Act based solely on foreign
conduct) and EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 248 (1991) (stating that Title
VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act does not apply to American workers abroad for this
presumption against “extraterritorial effect.”). But neither of these cases appears to be
analogous to the situation that prompted enactment of § 271(f): a call by the Supreme
Court to Congress in Deepsouth Packing to change the situation, which Congress did in
1984.
102
Microsoft, 127 S.Ct. at 1758-59.
103
See supra note 81.
104
See id. at 1757, n. 14. The majority states: “[i]n a footnote, Microsoft suggests that
even a disk shipped from the United States, and used to install Windows directly on a
foreign computer, would not give rise to liability under § 271(f) if the disk were removed
after installation. See Brief for Petitioner 37, n. 11; cf. post, at 2-4 (Alito, J., concurring).
We need not and do not reach that issue here.” Contrast with Justice Alito’s concurring
opinion which states: “[b]ecause no physical object originating in the United States was
combined with these computers, there was no violation of §271(f). Accordingly, it is
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at exported software, there may be other technologies that might be
similarly replicated abroad for use in the “patented invention.” For
example, biological materials, such as cell cultures, may be replicated
from a source culture exported abroad for use in, for example, a patented
drug manufacturing process. How § 271(f) might apply to these other
technologies in view of Microsoft is an open question.
[40] Another problem is the unfortunate language in the Supreme Court’s
Microsoft opinion (including the concurring opinion)105 that might be read
to require that the “component” be attached to or physically embodied in a
“medium,” or even that the “component” be part of a device. This view
overstates what is required to support the Supreme Court’s holding (i.e.,
should be viewed as dicta), and is, in fact, not required by or necessarily
consistent with the express language of § 271(f).106 But the view that
Microsoft suggests the “component” must be embodied in a “medium” or
must be part of a device for § 271(f) to apply may gain credence until
resolved by subsequent court cases. Rather than clarifying how § 271(f)
should interpreted, this unfortunate and imprecise choice of wording by
the Supreme Court in the Microsoft case may create additional confusion.
B. IMPORTING INTO THE UNITED STATES107
[41] In 1988, Congress enacted § 271(g) to address the reverse issue of
Deepsouth Packing, namely importation of products into the United
irrelevant that the Windows software was not copied onto the foreign-made computers
directly from the master disk or from an electronic transmission that originated in the
United States.” Id. at 1762.
105
See id. at 1761. In his concurring opinion, Justice Alito states: “I agree with the Court
that a component of a machine, whether a shrimp deveiner or a personal computer, must
be something physical. Ante, at 9–11. This is because the word ‘component,’ when
concerning a physical device, is most naturally read to mean a physical part of the
device.” (citing Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 466 (1976) (component is
a “constituent part: INGREDIENT”) and Random House Dictionary of the English
Language 301 (1967) (component is a “a component part; constituent”)). Id.
106
See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
107
See generally Keyhani, supra note 44; A. Paul Victor, Preventing Importation of
Products in Violation of Property Rights, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 783, 802 (1985); Anna M.
Budde, Note, Liability of a Foreign Manufacturer Using a Patented Process for Indirect
Infringement, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 291 (1995); Glenn Law, Note, Liability Under the
Process Patent Amendments Act of 1988 for the Use of a Patented Process Outside the
United States, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 245 (1991).
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States.108 But unlike its predecessor, § 271(f), § 271(g) is limited to
imported products made by a U.S. patented process.109 Another unusual
feature of § 271(g) is that the imported product will not be treated as
infringing if that product (1) is “materially changed by subsequent
processes,” or (2) “becomes a trivial and nonessential component of
another product.”110 What is meant by a product that is “materially
108

Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 9003, 102 Stat. 1564 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §
271(g) (2000)). The effective date of § 271(g) was February 23, 1999. Bristol-Myers
Co. v. Erbamont, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 1038, 1044-45 (D. Del. 1989) (holding that
importation of a drug that occurred before effective date of § 271(g) does not infringe).
Even for suits filed on or after February 23, 1999, there was a “Grandfather Clause,”
which permitted continued use, sale, or importation of any specific product “already in
substantial and continuous sale or use” on January 1, 1988. Pub. L. No. 100-418, §
9006(b), 102 Stat. 1567. The “Grandfather Clause” has not proved to be a very useful
defense against alleged infringement under § 271(g). See, e.g., Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp. v.
Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553, 1562-63 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that the importation of
human growth hormone (hGH) made by patented process was not subject to “Grandfather
Clause.”); Shamrock Techs., Inc. v. Precision Micron Powders, Inc., 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1797
(E.D.N.Y 1991) (holding the “Grandfather Clause” only applies to the extent equitable
for the protection of commercial investments made or business commenced in the United
States before January 1, 1988, and that no showing had been made that it is equitable to
permit sales of infringing goods to continue or preclude recovery of damages for past
sales); Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. Nippon Steel Corp., 765 F. Supp. 224, 226-27 (E.D.
Pa. 1991) (holding that the “Grandfather Clause” applies only to persons in the United
States who are not allegedly infringing manufacturers, and there was no showing that
potential harm to domestic businesses would outweigh benefit gained by protecting
domestic patent holders).
109
The purpose of § 271(g) was to counter the diminishing value of U.S. patented
processes caused by such importation, as well as to conform U.S. law to that of Europe
and many other industrialized countries “to protect the continued growth of American
business.” See S. REP. NO. 100-83, at 10 (1987) (emphasis in original). See also Novo
Nordisk of N. Am., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 77 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(“Historically, it was not an act of patent infringement to import into the United States a
product made abroad by a process patented in the United States. Therefore, Congress,
concerned that foreign competitors were appropriating valuable American inventions,
enacted [§ 271(g)].”). In 1994, Congress also amended § 271(c) on contributory
infringement to refer to “importation” of components of “a patented machine,
manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing
a patented process.” S. REP. NO. 103-412, at 511 (1994). Not long after the enactment of
§ 271(g), the Federal Circuit further held that an “unfair trade practice” action may be
brought in the International Trade Commission under 19 U.S.C. § 1337 to prevent similar
importation of products made by a U.S. patented process. Amgen, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l
Trade Comm’n, 902 F.2d 1532, 1538-39 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
110
35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2000).
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changed” or becomes a “trivial and nonessential component” of another
product is left undefined by § 271(g).111
[42] Section 271(g) has been interpreted to require actual importation of
the product made by the U.S. patented process, and not just the possibility
that the product so made might be imported.112 Section 271(g) also does
not apply if the imported product is made by a patented process before the
patent issues, even if the product is imported into the United States after
the patent issues.113 There also may be a difference of opinion, at least in
two district court decisions, as to how actively or directly the alleged
infringer must be involved in the importation of the product for liability to
attach under § 271(g).114 A comforting thought for patentees concerned
about “parallel imports” from recalcitrant foreign licensees is that the
Federal Circuit has ruled that § 271(g) applies to products imported
111

There have only been two reported cases interpreting the meaning of “materially
changed” and none interpreting the meaning of “trivial and nonessential component”
under § 271(g). See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 82 F.3d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(holding that imported cefaclor converted from cephem compound made by patented
process was “materially changed” and did not infringe under § 271(g)); Bio-Tech. Gen.
Corp., 80 F.3d at 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that imported human growth hormone
(hGH) made by patented process infringed under § 271(g), and that “materially changed”
requires, at a minimum, a “real difference” between the imported product and the product
made by the patented process). The Federal Circuit has also held that these defenses to
actions under § 271(g) do not apply to “unfair trade practice” actions brought under 19
U.S.C. § 1337. See Kinik Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 362 F.3d 1359, 1361-63 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
112
Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1374 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (holding that the sale of asphalt plant to foreign customer did not infringe method
patent under § 271(g) because there was no evidence that the foreign customer used plant
in the United States or shipped products back to the United States); Robotic Vision Sys.
v. View Eng’g, Inc., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1117, 1119 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that § 271(g)
does not apply to possible use of patented method outside United States for a good that
might possibly be imported).
113
Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 252 F.3d 1306, 1318-19 (Fed. Cir. 2001),
vacated, 535 U.S. 1109 (2002).
114
Compare Pfizer, Inc. v. Aceto Corp., 853 F. Supp. 104, 105-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(holding that no infringement occurred under § 271(g) where foreign maker of flavor
enhancer allegedly made by U.S. patented process sold enhancer to another foreign
corporation that sold it to U.S. importer), with Budd Co. v. Complax Corp., 19
U.S.P.Q.2d 1318, 1320 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (holding that Canadian maker of parts made
by U.S. patented process that did not import those parts into the United States may still be
found liable under § 271 if it induces another to import those parts).
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without authorization of the patentee, even if the product was authorized
to be produced abroad.115
[43] Like other aspects of § 271(g), the term “product” is undefined. An
important case illustrating a much narrower interpretation of “product”
under § 271(g), versus the fairly generous or broad construction of
“component(s)” under § 271(f), is Bayer AG v. Housey Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.116 The patentee (Housey Pharmaceuticals) owned four patents
directed to a screening process that could be used to identify potential drug
candidates.117 The alleged infringer (Bayer) made drugs that were either
imported or about to be imported into the United States.118 Apparently,
Bayer was worried that it might be characterized as an infringer of Housey
Pharmaceuticals’ patented screening process that may have been used to
identify these drugs.119
[44] Bayer filed a declaratory judgment action, alleging that Housey
Pharmaceuticals’ patents were invalid, unenforceable or not infringed.120
Housey Pharmaceuticals then counterclaimed, alleging that Bayer
infringed the patented screening process under § 271(g).121 The district
court ruled in favor of Bayer, holding that § 271(g) applied only to
imported products derived from manufacturing processes, and not
information generated by a patented process.122 The district court further
ruled that Bayer’s use of this information that may have been generated by
Housey Pharmaceuticals’ patented screening process to identify these
drugs made § 271(g) no more applicable.123
[45] The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that § 271(g)
did not apply to the information generated by Bayer.124
While
acknowledging that § 271(g) referred to the “product” as being “made by a
115

Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 228 F.3d 1338, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
117
Id. at 1368-69.
118
Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms., Inc., 169 F.Supp.2d 328, 329 (D. Del. 2001).
119
See Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
120
Id.
121
Id. at 1369-70.
122
Id. at 1370.
123
See id.
124
Id. at 1368.
116
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patented process,” the Federal Circuit interpreted “made” to be the
equivalent of “manufactured.”125 This led the Federal Circuit to conclude
that the word “product,” as used in § 271(g), referred to physical goods,
such as drugs, and not information generated by a patented process.126
The Federal Circuit further concluded that the drugs produced by Bayer
using information generated by the patented process also did not infringe
under § 271(g).127 Thus, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court
that “processes of identification and generation of data are not steps in the
manufacture of a final drug product.”128
[46] The Bayer case has significant implications specifically for U.S.
patented processes used to identify potential drugs (commonly referred to
as “research tools”), especially where such drug research is likely to be
carried out offshore,129 as well as implications generally for any other
information or data generated abroad by a U.S. patented process. What is
still left open by Bayer is whether § 271(g) might apply where the
information or data generated by the U.S. patented process is reduced to a
physical product or form, for example, a non-volatile electronic storage
medium such as a CD-ROM, and then imported into the United States. A
U.S. patented process that included the specific step of reducing the
generated information/data to such a physical form might make this
argument more compelling. But given the Supreme Court’s recent
holding in the Microsoft case that § 271(f) did not apply to software
transmitted electronically abroad, it is far less likely in light of Bayer that
the Federal Circuit will hold that § 271(g) applies to information/data
generated abroad by a U.S. patented process which is electronically
transmitted into the United States. That leaves a potentially significant
“gap” in the protection provided by § 271(g) for U.S. patented processes
that primarily or exclusively generate information or data.

125

Id. at 1372.
Id. at 1375-76.
127
Id. at 1377-78.
128
Id. at 1377.
129
Accord, Synaptic Pharm. Corp. v. MDS Panlabs, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d 452, 463
(D.N.J. 2002) (holding § 271(g) does not apply to alleged infringer who advertised that
Taiwan-based affiliate could perform assays covered by patented method for performing
such assays, even when U.S. customers were instructed to forward samples for testing
directly to Taiwan with results subsequently being delivered to the U.S. customers).
126
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C. OFFERS TO SELL TO CUSTOMERS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES130
[47] In 1994, Congress amended §§ 271(a), 271(c) and 271(g) one last
time to include “offers to sell” in addition to “selling” or “using” as
infringing acts.131 This amendment was prompted by a need to bring U.S.
patent law into conformity with the GATT Uruguay Round of Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) agreement that the
United States had signed.132 No corresponding “offer to sell” language
was added to § 271(b) or § 271(f).133
[48] At a minimum, there must be proof of an actual or completed “offer
to sell” for infringement liability to attach.134 The big “wild card” in this
1994 amendment is whether an “offer to sell” made in the United States,
by itself, is enough to trigger such infringement liability for a sale to be
completed or finalized outside the United States. District courts in Texas
and California have said “no” on the basis that the added “offer to sell”
language merely established an earlier point for infringement liability to
attach for a sale that would otherwise take place or be completed in the

130

See generally Edwin D. Garleepp, An Analysis of the Patentee’s New Exclusive Right
to “Offer to Sell,” 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 315 (1999); Timothy R.
Holbrook, Territoriality Waning?: Patent Infringement for Offering in the United States
to Sell an Invention Abroad, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 701 (2004); Keyhani, supra note 44;
Robert R. Morishita, Note, Patent Infringement After GATT: What is an Offer to Sell?,
1997 UTAH L. REV. 905 (1997); David Sulkis, Note, Patent Infringement by Offer to Sell:
Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1099 (2001).
131
Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-465, § 533(a)(1)-(4). Section
533(a)(5) defines “offer for sale” or an “offer to sell” to be a sale that “will occur before
the expiration of the term of the patent.” Id.
132
See Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(holding that the 1994 amendment to § 271(a) relating to “offer to sell” served to
implement U.S. commitments under the TRIPS agreements). The effective date of these
1994 amendments was to be one year after the date on which the TRIPS Agreement
entered into force with respect to the United States (Jan. 1, 1995).
133
See id. at 1257-58 (holding that § 271(f)(2) does not apply to an “offer to supply”
component of patented invention, in view of amended language in § 271(a) about “offers
to sell” that does not appear in § 271(f)(2)).
134
Id. at 1256 (holding that there was no probative evidence of a completed “offer to sell”
under §271(a)). See also MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon
Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding no evidence of an “offer to sell”
occurring in the United States).
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United States.135 But the District Court of Delaware has said “yes” on the
basis that the added “offer to sell” language created a new, separate cause
of action for infringement.136
[49] So far, the Federal Circuit has not directly ruled on the issue whether
a bare “offer to sell” made in the United States to be completed outside the
United States causes infringement liability under §§ 271(a), 271(c) or
271(g).137 Several commentators have wondered or questioned whether
the added “offer to sell” language in these Sections does or should create
infringement liability for such “offers” where the sale is to be completed

135

Cybiotronics, Ltd. v. Golden Source Elecs., Ltd., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1170
(C.D.Cal. 2001) (holding that the alleged “offer for sale” from Hong Kong of product
made in Hong Kong that was imported by a third party into the United States was not an
infringing act under §§ 271(a), (b) or (c); infringement liability only attaches to the
importer); Quality Tubing, Inc. v. Precision Tube Holdings Corp., 75 F. Supp. 2d 613,
624-25 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (finding that negotiation and execution in the United States of a
contract to sell a product to be delivered in Scotland and Norway for use in Norway is not
an “offer to sell” constituting an act of infringement under §§ 271(a) and (g)). In
reaching the conclusion that a bare “offer to sell” made in the United States was not
enough for infringement liability to attach, the district courts in Quality Tubing and
Cybiotronics expressed concerns about extending the geographical scope of U.S. patent
law. See, e.g., Quality Tubing, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 625 (finding that the court’s
construction does not expand territorial jurisdiction of United States (citing Deepsouth
Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972)).
136
Wesley Jessen Corp. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 228, 234-35 (D. Del.
2003) (holding that an offer made in the United States to sell infringing lenses to overseas
buyers constitutes “offer for sale” under § 271(a)). The Court in Wesley Jessen
acknowledged the prior contrary rulings in Quality Tubing and Cybiotronics, but chose
not to follow them as being in conflict with the Federal Circuit’s decisions in Rotec
Indus. and 3D Sys. (3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs, Inc., 160 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
137
This issue was raised in Rotec, but the majority of the Federal Circuit panel did not
reach it because of insufficient evidence to establish a completed “offer to sell” of the
accused system. See Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., 340 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003). See
also Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d 1113, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2004) cert denied,
543 U.S. 1003 (2004) (“Pellegrini [the patentee] speculates that had there been
admissible evidence to show an offer for sale occurring in the United States [in Rotec],
the Court would have judged otherwise. Be that as it may, there is no evidence of record
here that Analog [the alleged infringer] has offered to sell the ADMC chips
domestically.”) (internal quotations omitted); Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1258 (Newman, J.,
concurring) (holding that merely an “offer to sell” made in the United States would not
be an infringing act under § 271(a) because the making, sale and use of the accused
system occurred completely outside the United States).
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outside the United States. 138 Construing this added “offer to sell”
language to create a separate cause of action for infringement liability
under §§ 271(a), 271(c) and 271(g) is somewhat like the “tail wagging the
dog.” More importantly, raising such a minimal level of activity in the
United States (an offer to sell) to the status of an infringing act appears to
be far more intrusive on “foreign patent sovereignty” than was the Federal
Circuit’s decision in the AT&T case (subsequently reversed by the
Supreme Court in Microsoft) to apply § 271(f) to foreign copies made
from exported software.
D. ACTIVELY INDUCING INFRINGEMENT OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES
[50] While Congress was prying off the “dead hand” of Deepsouth
Packing by adding “new” §§ 271(f) and 271(g) and amending §§ 271(a)
and 271(c), the courts brought a new wrinkle to pursuing offshore
activities with “old” § 271(b).139 Section 271(b) on “actively inducing
infringement” is the shortest in the § 271 arsenal, but is also potentially the
most lethal in reaching activities that occur outside the United States.
Prior to 1982 when the Federal Circuit came into being, the Seventh
Circuit, Eastern District of Michigan and Southern District of New York
had held that § 271(b) could reach activities outside the United States that
induced direct infringement within the United States.140 After 1982,
decisions by the Southern District of New York and possibly the District
138

See Chisum, supra note 49, at 607 (1997) (posing the question of whether an offer by
a person in another country to a customer in the United States is an offer in the United
States, even though sale will be consummated or product delivered outside the United
States.); David Tellekson & Elizabeth Bernard, Have Patent, Will Travel: Can One
Infringe a U.S. Patent by Making, Using, and Selling a Product Solely Outside the United
States?, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, July, 2004, at 40, 41 (2004) (agreeing with Judge
Newman’s concurrence in Rotec and arguing against interpreting an “offer to sell”
language applying to sales consummated abroad).
139
See generally Keyhani, supra note 44.
140
See Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding
that active inducement of infringement under § 271(b) may be found in events that occur
outside the United States if they result in direct infringement in the United States);
Nippon Elec. Glass Co. v. Sheldon, 489 F. Supp. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that
inducing and contributory infringement under §§ 271(b) and 271 (c) do not require any
activity in the United States as long as direct infringement occurs in the United States);
Kearns v. Wood Motors, Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. 485 (E.D. Mich.,1978) (holding that active
inducement of infringement under § 271(b) may occur outside the United States as long
as such inducement results in direct infringement in the United States).
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Court of Delaware continued to hold that § 271(b) would reach such
activities.141
[51] The Federal Circuit’s position on whether § 271(b) might apply to
inducing activities occurring wholly outside the United States is unclear.142
In MEMC Electronic Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon
Corp.,143 the Federal Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment in
favor of the alleged infringer (“SUMCO”) that infringement was not
induced under § 271(b). SUMCO made the alleged infringing silicon
wafers in Japan, sold these wafers to Samsung Japan; Samsung Japan then
sold these wafers to Samsung Austin Semiconductor in the United States.
The Federal Circuit held there were genuine issues of material fact as to
whether SUMCO induced infringement under § 271(b) because: (1) it
knew of Samsung Austin Semiconductor’s infringing activities in the
United States and provided substantial technical support to Samsung
Austin Semiconductor in the form of e-mail communications; (2) evidence
that SUMCO sent certain wafers directly to Samsung Austin
Semiconductor to address technical problems with previously-supplied
SUMCO wafers; and (3) evidence that SUMCO personnel made several
on-site visits to Samsung Austin Semiconductor during which
141

Kabushiki Kaisha Hattori Sieko v. Refac Tech. Dev. Corp., 690 F. Supp. 1339
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that a foreign seller may be liable for inducing infringement or
contributory infringement under §§ 271(b) or (c) even though seller did not make, use, or
sell product in the United States); Akzona, Inc. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 662 F.
Supp. 603 (D. Del. 1987) (holding that apprehension regarding potential liability for
inducing and contributory infringement under §§ 271(b) and (c) does not support
declaratory judgment action absent a showing of potential direct infringement).
142
In Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., the Federal Circuit lifted an injunction based on
infringement under § 271(b) against sales of plants capable of practicing the patented
method because the purchasers of the equipment might not be able to practice the
patented method during the term of patent; it is unclear from the decision whether the
alleged infringer was planning to import the equipment for the plant from outside the
United States. Joy Techs., Inc. v. Falkt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 773-74 (Fed. Cir. 1993). In
Int’l Rectifier Corp. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., the Federal Circuit vacated a contempt order
based on a permanent injunction that included activities of the alleged infringer that
occurred wholly outside the United States; the allegation of infringement was based on §
271(a), so the issue of infringement based on “inducement” under § 271(b) was not at
issue. Int’l Rectifier Corp. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 361 F.3d 1355, 1360-61 (Fed. Cir.
2004),
143
MEMC Electronic Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d
1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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presentations of SUMCO wafers were made.144 While MEMC Electronic
may support the proposition that § 271(b) applies to inducing activities
occurring wholly outside the United States, there was enough evidence
presented of “inducing activities” occurring inside the United States to
make it uncertain whether the Federal Circuit would have ruled the way it
did if these “inducing activities” had occurred wholly outside the United
States.
IV. INFRINGING ACROSS THE CYBERSPACE DIVIDE: INTERNET AND
RELATED TRANSNATIONAL TECHNOLOGIES
[52] The dawning of the “cyberspace age” has brought new challenges for
§ 271.145 In amending § 271 from 1984 through 1994, Congress
obviously never contemplated or realized the impact of the Internet and its
related transnational technologies. Unlike the territorial nature of patents,
the Internet knows no territorial boundaries. With the Internet, infringing
activities now have greater propensity to span or “straddle” across
territorial borders.
The increase in wireless telecommunication
technologies has also made the Internet’s ability to “straddle”
transnational borders less visible but even more omnipresent. The courts
are now feeling the strain in making infringement determinations under §
271 when the Internet and related transnational technologies are involved.
[53] In 1976, the Court of Claims first grappled with technologies
involving potential transnational infringement in the Decca Ltd. v. United
States.146 What makes the Decca case unusual is that infringement was
not determined under § 271. Instead, infringement was determined under
§ 1498(a) of Title 28 147 because the alleged infringer in Decca was the
United States.
144

Id. at 1378-79.
See generally Dan L. Burk, Communications Symposium: Transborder Intellectual
Property Issues on the Electronic Frontier, 6 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 9 (1994); Dan L.
Burk, Patents in Cyberspace: Territoriality and Infringement on Global Computer
Networks, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1993); Yar Chaikovsky & Adrian Percer, Globalization,
Technology Without Boundaries & the Scope of U.S. Patent Law, 9 INTELL. PROP. L.
BULL. 95 (2005); Keyhani, supra note 44; Keith E. Witek, Software Patent Infringement
on the Internet and on Modern Computer Systems-Who Is Liable for Damages?, 14
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 303 (1998); Homiller, supra note 23.
146
Decca, Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070 (Fed. Cl. 1976).
147
28 U.S.C. §1498(a) states, in relevant part:
145
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[54] Decca is also the odd case where the alleged infringing activities of
the federal government occurred within and without the United States. In
Decca, the alleged infringing device was the United States worldwide
Omega hyperbolic radio navigation system148 for positioning ships and
aircraft.149 The Omega system involved three transmitting stations.150
Two of these transmitting stations were located in Hawaii and North
Dakota. One was located in Norway.151
[55] The Omega system was alleged to infringe a patent on hyperbolic
radio navigation systems.152 Besides the location of the one transmitter
outside the United States, another complicating factor was that U. S. flag
vessels and aircraft receiving these signals, would, for the most part, be
outside U.S. territorial boundaries as well.153 The Court of Claims
affirmed the trial judge’s ruling that the Omega system infringed, but not
on the basis that U. S. flag vessels and aircraft that received signals from
the Omega system were, in essence, an “ambulatory portion of U. S.
territory.”154
[56] Instead, the Court, with Deepsouth Packing in mind, ruled that
infringement by the Omega system occurred within the United States.155
First, the Court of Claims correctly observed that by “its very nature the
Whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the
United States is used or manufactured by or for the United States
without license of the owner thereof or lawful right to use or
manufacture the same, the owner's remedy shall be by action against
the United States in the United States Court of Federal Claims for the
recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for such use and
manufacture. . . .
28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (emphasis added).
148
A hyperbolic navigation system like the Omega system requires at least three
transmitting stations so the receiver on the vessel or aircraft receiving the signal can
know its exact position. Decca, 544 F.2d at 1074.
149
Id.
150
Id. There were plans to include upward of eight transmitting stations in the Omega
system.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id. at 1072.
154
Id.
155
Id. at 1074.
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system cannot be confined to one country.”156 Second, the Court further
observed that the Omega system was not “without territoriality merely
because it operates in more than one country, and at sea.”157
[57] The Court then made a quantum leap in logic. Even though one of
the transmitting stations was outside the United States, the Court held that
the location of the Omega system, as a whole, was where the “master
station or stations” were located, namely those in Hawaii and North
Dakota,158 and “where all the stations are monitored, presently
Washington, D.C.”159 The Court treated the receivers on the U. S. flag
vessels and aircraft, as well as the station in Norway, as not having “any
necessary connection with the location of Omega system” for the purpose
of determining infringement under U.S. patent law.160 The Court further
argued that its analysis was in agreement with the decision in Rosen v.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration,161 where the Patent
Office Board of Patent Interferences ruled that operation of a method and
system for orienting space satellites that occurred partially in space was
still considered a reduction to practice within the United States because
the location of the control stations for that satellite were in the United
States.162
[58] The Court of Claims’ ruling in the Decca case has been referred to as
the “control point” test.163 Decca might have been less controversial if the
Court had simply relied on the fact that only United States entities were
engaged in the infringing activities, no matter where they were located.
Unlike § 271, § 1498(a) does not specifically address where the alleged

156

Id.
Id.
158
Hawaii and North Dakota were considered “master stations” because all stations in the
Omega system had “to be brought into exact synchronization with the United States
stations.” Id.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Rosen v. Nat’l Aeronautics and Space Admin., 152 U.S.P.Q. 757 (1966).
162
Decca, 544 F.2d at 1074.
163
See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 197, 242 (Ct. Cl. 1993);
Freedom Wireless, Inc. v. Boston Comm’n. Group, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 11, 16 (D.
Mass. 2002).
157
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infringing acts must occur, only what party committed those acts.164 The
Rosen case, which involved reduction to practice, not infringement, is
extremely tenuous support for the “control point” test articulated in Decca.
In fact, the Court of Claims later ruled in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United
States that § 1498(a) does not apply to infringing activities of the United
States in outer space.165 Accordingly, applying the Decca “control point”
test to later cases involving transnational infringing activities under § 271
was not without some uncertainty.
[59] The uncertainty and difficulty in applying the “control point” test to
transnational infringing activities under § 271 first surfaced in the 2002
case of Freedom Wireless, Inc. v. Boston Communications Group, Inc.166
Freedom Wireless involved pre-paid wireless services provided by a
Canadian wireless telephone service provider, Rogers Wireless. In fact,
Rogers Wireless was not licensed to do business in the United States, and
none of its services or equipment was available to U.S. residents. The
only contact that Rogers Wireless had with the United States was Boston
Communications Group, Inc. (“BCGI”) that Roger Wireless had
contracted with to provide prepaid billing services necessary for Roger
Wireless to provide its prepaid wireless services to its Canadian
customers.167
[60] BCGI provided its prepaid billing services to wireless carriers, such
as Roger Wireless, using BCGI’s proprietary system where wireless calls
designated as prepaid were rerouted from the outside carrier to BCGI’s
system.168 BCGI’s system consisted of multiple receiving stations (nodes)
that were linked to a central computer database that analyzed the calls to
determine whether the caller had sufficient funds to complete the call and
164

Section 1498(c) does say that recovery under § 1498(a) is barred for a “claim arising
in a foreign county.” It was not until 2002 that the Court of Claims construed § 1498(c)
within the context of § 271(a) to require that infringing acts under § 1498(a) must occur
within the United States. See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 829 (Fed. Cl.
2002).
165
Hughes Aircraft, 29 Fed. Cl. at 197. Decca and Rosen were distinguished because the
“control point” or “master station” of the alleged infringing satellite was not located in
the United States. Id.
166
Freedom Wireless, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 16.
167
Id. at 13.
168
Id. at 13-14.
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the maximum duration of the call.169 One of these BCGI nodes located in
Canada would receive calls forwarded by Roger Wireless and would send
the call, along with other information relating to the caller, to BCGI’s
central database located in Woburn, Massachusetts.170 This central
database, after determining the cost of the requested call and maximum
duration of the call, would send this information back across the border to
the Canadian node. Thus the only contact with the United States was
BCGI’s central database.171
[61] The patentee (Freedom Wireless) owned two patents on prepaid
wireless services and sued Roger Wireless and twelve other wireless
carriers for patent infringement in the District Court for the Northern
District of California.172 The case was eventually transferred to the
District Court for Massachusetts.173 Roger Wireless moved for summary
judgment on alternative grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction and that
there was no infringement under § 271 because the patented invention was
not used by Roger Wireless in the United States.174
[62] The District Court for Massachusetts granted summary judgment in
favor of Roger Wireless on the ground that there was no infringement by it
under § 271.175 Freedom Wireless argued that Roger Wireless did use the
patented prepaid wireless system in the United States because of the
reliance on BCGI’s billing system located in Massachusetts.176 The
District Court for Massachusetts acknowledged the “control point”
doctrine of the Decca case and that “a transnational system that extends
beyond the United States border can satisfy the territoriality requirement
where the system’s control point is present within the United States.”177
But the District Court for Massachusetts also pointed to the Hughes
Aircraft case as holding that an “extraterritorial spacecraft had never

169

Id.
Id.
171
Id. at 14.
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id. at 15.
177
Id. at 16.
170
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entered the United States” was not the “control point.”178 In ruling that
Roger Wireless’ system did not infringe in the United States, the District
Court for Massachusetts held that the BCGI’s database was not the
“control point” because it “did not direct, control or monitor Roger’s
prepaid wireless system in any way.”179
[63] The District Court for Massachusetts in Freedom Wireless also
treated the Decca and Hughes Aircraft cases as if they involved
infringement under § 271 which they did not. The Federal Circuit also
initially ignored this distinction in the subsequent case of NTP, Inc. v.
Research in Motion, Ltd.,180 involving the popular handheld BlackBerry
device. The NTP case actually involves two decisions by the Federal
Circuit. The first decision (BlackBerry I)181 held that use of the
BlackBerry device infringed both the method and system claims. The
second decision (BlackBerry II)182 supplanted BlackBerry I, and held that
use of the BlackBerry device infringed the system claims, but not the
method claims. Both decisions are important in understanding how the
Federal Circuit analyzes activities that occur across transnational
boundaries under § 271, and more importantly, how the type of claim may
determine whether or not those transnational activities will be treated as
infringing under § 271.183
[64] In BlackBerry I and BlackBerry II, the patented technology involved
systems and methods for integrating existing electronic mail systems
(“wireline” systems) with radio frequency (“RF”) wireless communication
178

Id. at 17.
Id. The District Court for Massachusetts observed that the BCGI database was
analogous to the domestic “central communications link for tracking and data acquisition
services” which the Court of Claims in Hughes Aircraft found was not the “control point”
for the allegedly infringing spacecraft. The Court also noted that if Roger Wireless had a
“control point, that point appears to have been the Rogers’ [Wireless] network of mobile
telephone switching offices in Canada.” Id.
180
NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd. (BlackBerry I), 392 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir.
2004), withdrawn and substituted, 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S.
1157 (2006).
181
Id. at 1370.
182
NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd. (BlackBerry II), 418 F.3d 1282, 1325 (Fed. Cir.
2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1157 (2006).
183
Interestingly, neither BlackBerry I, nor BlackBerry II, refers to the earlier decision by
the District Court for Massachusetts in Freedom Wireless. See id.
179
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networks to enable a mobile user to receive e-mail over a wireless
network.184 In traditional e-mail systems, a message addressed to the
recipient is stored on the recipient’s e-mail server until the recipient
initiates a connection with the e-mail server and downloads the message
from the e-mail server onto the recipient’s handheld device (e.g., PDA).
This traditional configuration is referred to as a “pull” system because
received e-mails cannot be distributed to the recipient’s handheld device
without a connection being initiated by the recipient to “pull” messages
from the e-mail server.185
[65] In contrast, the accused BlackBerry system used a “push” e-mail
technology to route messages to the recipient’s handheld device without
initiating a connection to the e-mail server.186 What would happen instead
was that software installed on the recipient’s personal computer would
detect and retrieve the received messages on the e-mail server and would
then copy, encrypt and route those messages to the BlackBerry “Relay”
component of Research in Motion’s (“RIM’s”) wireless network.187
RIM’s wireless network would then deliver the routed message to the
recipient’s handheld BlackBerry device.188
[66] Much of the Federal Circuit’s discussion in BlackBerry I and
BlackBerry II is devoted to claim interpretation. Even so, the linchpin of
the infringement ruling in BlackBerry I and BlackBerry II revolved around
one component, namely the BlackBerry “Relay” (known in claim
language as an “interface” or “interface switch”) which was located in
Canada.189 Simply stated, all use of the handheld BlackBerry device
inside the United States required that the messages be routed to or from
this BlackBerry “Relay” located outside the United States.190
[67] In BlackBerry I, Federal Circuit Judge Linn noted the existence of,
“an added degree of complexity” in that the BlackBerry system
“comprised[] multiple distinct components” whose nature permitted “their
184
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function and use to be separated from their physical location.”191 The
Federal Circuit then phrased the question as “whether the location of a
component of an accused system abroad, where that component facilitates
operation of the accused system in the United States, prevents the
application of § 271(a) to that system.”192 Focusing on “use of the
patented invention,” the Federal Circuit said that the “plain language” of §
271(a) did not preclude infringement where the system alleged to infringe
a system or method claim is used within the United States, “even though a
component of that system is physically located outside the United
States.”193 As far as the Federal Circuit was concerned, use of the
BlackBerry system between two domestic users occurred within the
United States “regardless of whether the messages exchanged between
them may be transmitted outside of the United States at some point along
their wireless journey.”194
[68] What about the “territoriality” of § 271(a) espoused by Deepsouth
Packing? The Federal Circuit initially addressed this issue by stating that
Congress, in its 1984 amendments that led to § 271(f), had taken up the
offer by the Supreme Court in Deepsouth Packing to close the “export
loophole” in § 271. The Federal Circuit then distinguished Deepsouth
Packing by citing the Decca case and holding that the location of the
infringement (through use of the BlackBerry system) was within the
United States territory, not abroad.195
[69] The Federal Circuit observed that, like the Decca case, the only
component of the BlackBerry system outside the United States was the
BlackBerry “Relay” located in Canada.196 Because all other components
of the BlackBerry system were located within the United States, the
Federal Circuit stated that “the control and beneficial use of” the
BlackBerry system occurred within the United States.197 This led the
Federal Circuit to conclude that “the situs of the use” of the BlackBerry
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system for the purposes of § 271(a) was also within the United States.198
Because the “control and beneficial use of” the BlackBerry system was
within the United States, that was enough to “establish territoriality under
section 271(a).”199
[70] What makes Blackberry II significantly different from Blackberry I
is the Federal Circuit’s further refinement of its infringement analysis to
distinguish between “use” that would infringe a system claim, and “use”
that would infringe a method claim. At least part of that refinement was
based on an observation by the Federal Circuit about the grammatical
structure of § 271(a) that was unmentioned in Blackberry I. In Blackberry
II, the Federal Circuit treated the “within the United States” portion of §
271(a) as a separate requirement from the infringing acts clause (e.g., “use
of the patented invention”).200 Because of this “separateness,” the Federal
Circuit found it “unclear” as to “how the territoriality requirement limits
direct infringement where the location of at least part of the ‘patented
invention’ is not the same as the location of the infringing act.”201
[71] While RIM argued that Deepsouth Packing answered this question;
the Federal Circuit did not agree.202 Instead, the Federal Circuit once
more relied on the Decca case as being “instructive.”203 Even more
interesting and startling was that the Federal Circuit quoted language from
Decca that appeared not in the Court of Claims’ opinion, but in the trial
judge’s opinion.204 In fact, it is BlackBerry II, not BlackBerry I that makes
clear where the Federal Circuit’s reference to “beneficial use” comes
from. Also unlike BlackBerry I, BlackBerry II acknowledged that Decca
“was decided in the context of § 1498” involving use by the United States,
but that the question of use within the United States was implicated
“because direct infringement under section 271(a) is a necessary predicate
for government liability under section 1498.”205
198
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[72] Using Decca as “the legal framework for analyzing” infringement,
the Federal Circuit then reached the conclusion that this analysis “[n]ot
only will . . . differ for different types of infringing acts, it will also differ
as the result of the differences between different types of claims.”206 For
this reason, the Federal Circuit in BlackBerry II analyzed the alleged
infringing acts separately with regard to the system and method claims.207
[73] Regarding the claimed system, the Federal Circuit held that such
“use” under § 271(a) “is the place at which the system as a whole is put
into service,” or in the language of Decca, “the place where control of the
system is exercised and beneficial use of the system obtained.”208 As the
Federal Circuit saw it, the users of the BlackBerry device “located within
the United States controlled the transmission of the originated information
and also benefited from such an exchange of information.”209 That was
enough for “infringing use” of the claimed system to occur within the
United States. The fact that the BlackBerry “Relay” was located in
Canada did not matter.210
[74] Regarding the claimed method, the Federal Circuit reached a
different conclusion. As the Federal Circuit saw it, use of a method
“necessarily involves doing or performing each of the steps recited.”211
This was unlike the use of a system where “the components are used
collectively, not individually.”212 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held
that a process (or method) could not be used within the United States
under § 271(a) “unless each of the steps is performed within this
country.”213 In the case of the claimed method, the location of the
206
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Id. The Federal Circuit relied on Zoltek Corp. v. United States, in which the Court of
Claims stated that “if a private party practiced even one step of a patented process outside
of the United States, it avoided infringement liability.” 51 Fed. Cl. 829, 836 (Fed. Cl.
2002). Zoltek was construing § 1498(c) which barred recovery under § 1498(a) of a
“claim arising in a foreign country.” Id. Even so, the analysis and holding in Zoltek
relied heavily on prior case law construing § 271(a) to require that all steps of the claimed
process/method occur within the United States. See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442
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BlackBerry “Relay” in Canada did matter because not all of the recited
steps (i.e., the utilization of an “interface” or “interface switch”)
occasioned by use of the BlackBerry device would occur within the
United States. In addition to holding that there was no infringement of the
claimed method under § 271(a), the Federal Circuit further concluded
there was no infringement of the claimed method under §§ 271(f)214 or
271(g).215
[75] The “control and beneficial use” test enunciated by the Federal
Circuit in BlackBerry I and BlackBerry II has been criticized for failing to
provide “an adequate explanation” that “is likely to cause far more
confusion than would otherwise have arisen” and for “seriously, and
unjustifiably” undermining the holding in Deepsouth Packing.216 The
Canadian government also filed an Amicus brief in support of RIM’s
request for rehearing in Blackberry I on the ground that the Federal
Circuit’s decision may have “unfortunate, and unintended consequences,
affecting Canada’s interest, as well as the interest of Canadian companies

F.3d 1345, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (citing Blackberry II and affirming the
Court of Claims holding that § 1498(a), like § 271(a), requires all steps of the claimed
process/method to occur within the United States). The Federal Circuit was not
unanimous on the per curiam opinion in Zoltek. Judge Gajarsa concurred that § 1498(a)
required all steps of the claimed process/method to occur within the United States, but
not on the basis of Blackberry II, stating that Blackberry II represented “an unchecked
propagation in our case law, and its viability may eventually be challenged.” Id. at 1354.
Senior Judge Plager dissented, arguing that the holding in Blackberry II (i.e., that §
271(a) required all steps of the claimed process/method to occur within the United States)
did not apply to § 1498(a). Id. at 1378-81.
214
Id. at 1321-23. In support of infringement under § 271(f), NTP argued that the
claimed system must be formed somewhere and that “RIM induced or intended that
formation by supplying components in the United States.” Id. at 1321. The Federal
Circuit considered this argument only in the context of the claimed method, and rejected
it on the ground that supply of the BlackBerry device to users in the United States did not
“supply” any “component” steps for combination in the claimed method, citing Standard
Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc. and Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc.
215
Id. at 1323. RIM argued that the product created by the claimed method was “data or
information” and that Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms., Inc., held that § 271(g) did not cover
such activity. The Federal Circuit agreed with RIM that “transmission” of such
information by the BlackBerry system was no different from the “production” of such
information in Bayer, concluding that § 271(g) “does not apply to the asserted method
claims in this case any more than it did in Bayer.”
216
Homiller, supra note 23, at ¶18 (commenting on BlackBerry I).
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carrying on multi-jurisdictional operations.217 The criticism that the
“control and beneficial use” test may cause “confusion” in its later
application is probably supportable. But the arguments that Blackberry I
and Blackberry II “unjustifiably undermine” the holding in Deepsouth
Packing, or will have “unfortunate and unintended consequences” on
companies involved in “multi-jurisdictional operations,” are not
persuasive when considered carefully. Congress, through its amendments
starting in 1984 that created § 271(f), had already “undermined” the
holding in Deepsouth Packing. Allowing an infringer to escape on the
technicality that a small portion of the claimed invention is practiced
outside the United States, but where the impact of the infringing activity is
felt most, as it was in Blackberry I and II, within the United States also has
“unfortunate and unintended consequences.”
V. PROPOSED SCENARIOS INVOLVING “STRADDLE” TECHNOLOGIES: IS
THERE A COMPREHENSIVE AND CONSISTENT APPROACH FOR APPLYING
§ 271?
[76] Consider now the five Scenarios presented earlier in Section I of this
article. Scenarios 1, 2, 3A, 3B and 4 illustrate some potential situations
involving the Internet where the relevant activities “straddle” territorial
borders. Scenarios 1, 2, 3A and 3B were also hypotheticals contemplated
by this author as early as 2001, and before any significant applicable case
law existed such as the AT&T, Bayer, BlackBerry, and Microsoft cases.
Scenario 4 should be recognizable as essentially the same situation in the
BlackBerry case, but with the location of the consumer use and the
BlackBerry “Relay” reversed.
[77] So how might Scenarios 1, 2, 3A, 3B and 4 be resolved today under
§ 271? Here are some possible thoughts:218
Scenario 1. Section 271(g) may or may not apply. Much
depends on whether the downloaded software is considered
a “product” or is simply “information” or “data” under the
Bayer case.
Section 271(b) may apply because of
217

See Adam Mizera, Canadian Government Support Rehearing in U.S. Blackberry
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“inducing infringement.” Section 271(a) might possibly
apply to the patented system (but not the patented method)
under the “control and beneficial use” test of the
BlackBerry case because the “control and beneficial use” of
Offshore Seller’s web site occurs primarily in the United
States.
Scenario 2. Depending on how the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Microsoft is interpreted, § 271(f) may or may
not apply. Much may depend on whether: (a) servers 1
and 2 are both located in the United States; and (b) the
downloaded computer files from the U.S.-based server(s)
qualify as “all or a substantial portion of the components”
under Microsoft. Section 271(b) may apply because of
“inducing infringement.” But Section 271(a) might not
apply under the “control and beneficial use” test of the
BlackBerry case because the “control and beneficial use” of
the downloaded computer files is greater offshore, than
onshore.
Scenarios 3A. Section 271(f) does not apply because the
software is not being exported. Section 271(g) does not
apply because, while the downloaded software contains the
“patented process,” it was not made by the “patented
process,” especially in view of the Bayer case. Section
271(b) might apply because of “inducing infringement.”
Section 271(a) might also apply if electronic transmission
of the software is considered “importation” (similar to
“supplying” under Section 271(f)) of the software and if the
software is considered to embody the “patented invention”
(more likely true for the patented system than the patented
method).
Scenario 3B. In view of the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Microsoft, applying § 271(f) to this fact pattern
is very problematic. For example, would a majority of the
Supreme Court consider the downloaded software to be a
“component” of the patented system and method? More
significantly,
would
downloading
the
software
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electronically qualify as “supplying” under the restrictive
view espoused in Microsoft? Section 271(b) may apply
because of “inducing infringement.” But § 271(a) might
not apply under the “control and beneficial use” test of
BlackBerry because the “control and beneficial use” of the
downloaded software is greater offshore, than onshore.
Scenario 4. Section 271(a) may or may not apply. This
“reverse” BlackBerry situation is very similar to Freedom
Wireless. A holding of no infringement according to
Freedom Wireless is not necessarily inconsistent with the
“control and beneficial use” test of BlackBerry because the
“control and beneficial use” of system and method is
primarily outside the United States. Section 271(b) may
also apply for “inducing infringement” of at least the
patented system and possibly the patented method as well.
[78] As can be seen, each of Scenarios 1, 2, 3A, 3B and 4 provide
challenges in applying § 271 because the recited activities in each
Scenario “straddle” territorial borders in different ways regarding the
offshore and onshore components. And that illustrates one of the
significant limitations of the current “patchwork” that is now § 271. As
the Bayer, the BlackBerry, and more recently the Microsoft cases painfully
show, current § 271 does not provide a comprehensive and consistent
approach for determining patent infringement when the alleged infringing
activities cross or “straddle” territorial borders.
VI. CONCLUSION: WHAT SHOULD BE THE APPROPRIATE REACH OF § 271
TO ACTIVITIES THAT “STRADDLE” TERRITORIAL BORDERS?
[79] When Congress finally decided to overturn Deepsouth Packing by
enacting § 271(f) in 1984, they had a “golden opportunity” to provide a
comprehensive and consistent approach to infringement determinations
involving activities both inside and outside the United States.
Unfortunately, Congress, in its usual fashion, responded simply to the
issue at hand, namely exportation of unassembled components of a
patented invention. This “patchwork” approach by Congress has left the
Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit and the lower district courts with the
unenviable task of trying to render consistent infringement interpretations
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for a variety of situations that do not always fit easily within the various
paragraphs of § 271. In short, Congress, in addressing the gaps opened by
Deepsouth Packing, has provided no comprehensive or consistent
framework or scheme in § 271 for addressing those gaps. And with the
Supreme Court resurrecting the presumption against “extraterritorial
effects” ghost in Microsoft, the “dead hand” of Deepsouth Packing lingers
on.
[80] This lack of a comprehensive and consistent framework or scheme is
evident in the 1988 amendment leading to § 271(g) which protects against
importation of products made abroad by U.S. patented processes. Section
271(g) does provide a new avenue for reaching infringing activities that
occurred partially offshore. But § 271(g) achieves this objective by using
different words or terms (“product”) from those used in other paragraphs
(“component(s)” in § 271(f)). This has resulted in statutory construction
problems where what appear to be similar situations are treated
differently. Compare the Bayer case where “product” in § 271(g) was
interpreted narrowly to exclude data or information, with cases such as
Eolas where “component(s)” in § 271(f) has been interpreted more
generously to include software.
[81] The most “glaring” statutory construction issue may have occurred in
the 1994 amendments that added the “offer to sell” language to §§ 271(a),
(c) and (g). Providing an earlier point for asserting infringement liability
may be a laudatory and necessary goal. But at least one district court has
suggested that this added language might permit infringement liability to
attach where the only connection with the United States is that the “offer
to sell” the patented invention occurred onshore. Such an apparently
bizarre result based on such a minimal level of activity in the United
States is not only intrusive on “foreign patent sovereignty,” but provides
infringement liability that is greatly disproportionate to the impact of the
offending act occurring onshore.
[82] The Internet and related global-impacting technologies have
increased the challenge and the stakes for what is, or should be, the
appropriate reach of § 271 to activities that “straddle” territorial borders.
The Federal Circuit, to a limited extent, has tried to deal with these
“straddle” situations by applying the “control and beneficial use” test in
Blackberry I and II. The “control and beneficial use” test may provide a
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potentially pragmatic and consistent approach for dealing with
infringement situations, such as those involving the Internet and related
transnational technologies, where the activities “straddle” territorial
borders.
[83] Most importantly, the “control and beneficial use” test at least
indirectly assesses whether or not the greatest impact of the infringing
activities that “straddle” these territorial borders are felt within the United
States. For example, under the “control and beneficial use” test, § 271(b)
should apply to offshore activities that directly induce infringement within
the United States because of the impact of those activities onshore. By
contrast, a bare “offer to sell” within the United States that has minimal or
no other impact onshore should not be treated as infringing under the
“control and beneficial use” test.
[84] Some have considered it to be arbitrary semantics that a patented
system, but not the corresponding patented method, infringe under the
“control and beneficial use” test of the Blackberry case. Making
determinations of infringement under § 271 of Internet and related
“straddle” technologies depend on the type of patent claim involved is,
indeed, somewhat arbitrary. But the current “patchwork” that is now §
271 has created this “arbitrariness.”
Until Congress provides a
comprehensive approach for determining patent infringement that
addresses all or most of the potential “straddle” problems of the Internet
and related transnational technologies, § 271 will remain burdened by the
“dead hand” of Deepsouth Packing.
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